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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The most prevalent way of viewing cognition in 
psychology is through mediational modeling, which dates back 
to the thinking of John Locke and other British Empiricists. 
The current trend in cognitive psychology is to use a 
computer model to frame cognition and memory. The picture 
of the person painted by this type of theorizing is one of a 
passive recipient of external inputs which mold the thinking 
and behavior (outputs) of the person according to 
mechanistic, computer-analogical (efficient-cause) 
processes. In this model, the person has little, if any, 
influence on the meanings they take on or the creation of 
new ideas. Meaning is taken in from external inputs. 
Rychlak (in press; 1988) has offered an alternative way 
of viewing human cognition through his Logical Learning 
Theory (LLT). Logical Learning Theory is based on another 
fundamental way of viewing cognition through predicational 
modeling, which follows in the tradition of Immanuel Kant.· 
The view represented by this line of thinking is of the 
person as an active participant in his or her conception of 
reality. Logical Learning Theory is founded on the 
principle that humans are teleological, meaning-processing 
beings. The individual "brings to bear" a mental pattern or 
structure that orders experience from birth. 
over thirty years of research, Rychlak and his 
colleagues have shown the influence of the fundamental 
processes of LLT--predication and oppositionality--in many 
areas, including thinking, learning, memory, and impression 
formation. The purpose of this thesis is to show the 
influence of the logical process of predication on memory 
retrieval. Predication involves cognizing broader patterns 
of meaning in relation to narrower or targeted patterns of 
meaning. In this study, we are utilizing affection (the 
individual's rendering of a positive or negative judgment, 
i.e., liking or disliking of something) as the broader 
pattern of meaning in which to frame the targeted items for 
memory retrieval. It is a tenet of LLT that the individual 
affectively assesses every aspect of cognition and 
experience. Affective predication represents the most 
abstract level of meaning in which particular ideas and 
other less abstract predications can be targeted. 
In this paper a review of Logical Learning Theory will 
be presented. The tenets of LLT will be contrasted with a 
mediational theoretical viewpoint. Further, some of the 
empirical work from LLT and other theories presaging the 
current study will be reviewed prior to the presentation of 
the experiments investigating the role of affective 
predication in memory retrieval. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theoretical Factors 
Introduction to Logical Learning Theory 
Logical Learning Theory (LLT) takes a humanistic, 
teleological view of human cognition and learning. The 
theory has been developed over the past thirty years by 
Joseph F. Rychlak (see Rychlak, in press, for a 
comprehensive review), and throughout its development, 
Rychlak and his colleagues have sought to establish a solid, 
empirical basis for their view of humans as meaning-
processing beings. Logical Learning Theory takes an 
introspective viewpoint in its study of the person by trying 
to understand people from their individual (personal, first-
person, etc.) perspective rather than from the extraspective 
(third-person) perspective of the "observer" looking "at" 
the person as is often the case in psychological theories 
(Rychlak, 1988) . 
Logical Learning Theory utilizes the term "logical" 
because it bases its explanations on the grounds of the 
Logos. Logos refers to the (formal-cause) patterned order 
of objects and events, enabling logical descriptions to take 
place (Rychlak, in press). The other grounds used to base 
3 
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explanation in psychology are the Bios, Physikos, and 
socius. Most commonly, psychological theories attempt to 
ground their explanations in the (efficient-cause) energies 
and the (material-cause) structures of the Bios (Rychlak, in 
press). When theorizing is grounded in the Bios or the 
Physikos, events are generally explained through the 
mechanistic process of "mediation." Logos theorizing 
utilizes such processes as "predication." In the next 
section, we will define and elaborate on mediation versus 
predication in psychological explanation, as well as the 
four causal meanings in order to orient the reader to the 
LLT point of view. 
Predicational versus Mediational Theorizing 
Before discussing the process of cognition postulated 
by LLT, we must first give the reader an understanding of 
the causal meanings that can frame any particular conception 
of events. The four causal meanings can be traced back to 
the thinking of Aristotle (in Hutchins, 1952), and they are 
metatheoretical assumptions used to account for the 
existence or occurrence of a thing/event (see Rychlak, in 
press or 1988 for a thorough discussion of the four causes). 
One of the ways one can attempt to understand the world is 
according to the material cause, or the substance of which 
it consists. The efficient cause is used in trying to 
account for the motions an object manifests over time or the 
impetus or thrust that instrumentally affects an object or 
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event. The analogy often used in this case is that of one 
billiard ball striking another to cause it to move (Rychlak, 
in press). A formal cause meaning can be used to explain a 
thing or event based on its pattern, shape, or ordering of 
elements. According to Rychlak (in press), this would 
include "the patterning of a logical analysis, the familiar 
outline of our friend's physiognomy, or the recognition of a 
tornado by the threatening funnel cloud in the distant sky" 
(p. 11). "That for the sake of which" an action takes 
place is what is entailed in the final cause. Final causes 
include the meanings of reason, purpose, and intention 
(Rychlak, in press) . 
The formal cause is implicitly tied to and, in fact, 
necessary for the final cause. It is the formal cause 
pattern or plan which is the "that" in the "that, for the 
sake of which" definition of final causation (Rychlak, 1991, 
p. 20). The meaning encompassed in the formal-cause "end" 
toward which a person is behaving allows us to understand 
why a person is behaving intentionally in a certain way. 
It is the implicit formal-final cause relationship that 
underlies the process of predication. Predication is a 
logical process concerned with the ordering of meanings, 
which (as referred to above) does not occur in biological or 
physical events (Rychlak, 1991). Rychlak (in press) defines 
predication as the process involving "the logical act of 
affirming, denying, or qualifying broader patterns of 
6 
meaning in sequacious extension to narrower or targeted 
patterns of meaning. The target is the point, aim, or end 
1telosl of the meaning extension" (italics in the original). 
Predication can be traced back to the ancient Greek thinkers 
and through the history of thought. It is evidenced in the 
way we seek to categorize, classify, and schematize our 
world in order to make sense of it, to lend meaning from 
what "is known" to what then "can be known" (Rychlak, in 
press). 
Predication can be seen in the cognitive organization 
of a statement, such as "John is reliable" in which we are 
targeting "John" within the broader realm of the concept of 
"reliability" or "reliable people" (Rychlak, in press). The 
predicate meaningfully extends itself to create some of the 
meaning of John. This logical relationship could be 
diagrammed with the use of Euler circles like those depicted 
in Figure 1 (Rychlak, in press). The larger circle, acting 
as the wider realm of meaning, is labeled "reliable people." 
The smaller circle, acting as the target, is labeled "John." 
The Euler circle diagram also presents us with the idea that 
the target could be "outside the circle" or "overlapping" 
with the broader circle. In these two cases, the meanings 
conveyed would be "John is not reliable" and "John is 
sometimes reliable," respectively. The "denying" and 
"qualifying" aspects of predication are exemplified in these 
instances. 
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• = John 
= Reliable People 
= "John is reliable" 
• = "John is not reliable" 
= "John is sometimes reliable" 
Fig. 1. Euler Circles as a Model for Predication 
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Predication is determined only by logical order. The 
precedent (wider) meanings extend sequaciously to the target 
in an immediate manner (Rychlak, 1991) . "A precedent 
meaning is one that goes before others in order or 
arrangement, as the major premise always precedes the minor 
premise of a syllogism, framing its general meaning so that 
the minor premise can only extend the meaning which is 
contained therein. A sequacious meaning is one that follows 
or flows logically from the meanings of precedents, 
extending these as intentions in a necessary fashion, once 
they have been affirmed" (Rychlak, in press) . The 
precedent-sequacious ordering of meanings involved in the 
predicational process takes place in the Logos. It must be 
emphasized, at this point, that logical order is not the 
same as temporal order. Time is irrelevant to the 
predicational process. According to Rychlak (in press), 
"[T]ime's passage does not influence, determine, or shape 
the predicational process. Order is the only factor that 
determines its course--from broader to narrower extension in 
meaning expression." 
Predication is also not tied to or restricted to the 
specific "contents" in the linguistic realm but is a 
"process" dealing with patterns of relationship in the realm 
of meaning. According to LLT, meaning is the logical 
relationship organized between an affirmed predicate and its 
target. The meaning of the former (serving as a precedent) 
is extended sequaciously to the latter (Rychlak, in press) . 
Rychlak (1991) gives the example of two sentences in which 
the same words are used to relate two different meanings to 
demonstrate the importance of the logical relationship in 
the predicational process: 
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In the sentence, "A person is like a tree" the meaning 
of "tree" is the predicate, acting as the wider 
referent within which to situate the concept of a 
"person." This sentence conveys a metaphorical 
allusion in which we would be thinking of the person as 
"rooted" in tradition, as possibly having a "hide" as 
thick and wrinkled as bark ... , and so forth. But in 
the sentence "A tree is like a person" we would grasp 
quite different understandings, to the effect that the 
limbs of a tree "reach out," (or] that it can "bend" 
under the weight of environmental pressure .•.. The 
meanings conveyed in such statements are therefore not 
simply "in" the words but primarily "in" the process 
that winds them together in a certain way. (p. 8) 
In the realm of LLT, one of the most important aspects 
of predication is oppositionality. Within the meaningful 
relationship of predication, there is always the "outside of 
the circle" of the broader premising meaning to consider 
(Rychlak, in press). Logical Learning Theory contends that 
"John" is not simply associated to "reliability" without the 
person initially rendering an evaluation of "John" within a 
context of "reliability versus unreliability" and 
meaningfully aligning John with reliability (Bugaj & 
Rychlak, 1989, p. 137). Rychlak (in press) defines 
oppositionality as a "'double predication' in which one 
predicate of a duality intrinsically delimits its target as 
being a contrary, contradiction, contrast, or negation of 
the meaning under extension, and, pari passu, the target in 
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guestion--serving now as a reverse predicate--returns the 
favor." (italics in the original). Oppositionality is an 
intrinsic part of meaning such that people are always forced 
to "take a position" on one side or the other of bipolar 
meanings as they cognize their experience. 
The predicational view of human cognition can be 
contrasted with the mediational modeling that has generally 
been espoused in psychological theories. The meaning of 
"mediation'' as it has been used in psychological theories is 
that of a mechanical process in which human cognition has 
been considered exclusively in terms of material/efficient 
causation and an extraspective perspective. In this model, 
meaning is always external to the person, and it is taken in 
passively. According to Rychlak (Bugaj & Rychlak, 1989), 
"The process of mediation involves a reliance on extrinsic 
factors to carry it forward: something that is taken in or 
input comes indirectly to direct the mediational process 
that was not initially a part of this process." (p. 136, 
italics in the original). In this type of model, "John" is 
associated to "reliable" in an unidirectional manner through 
the principles of frequency and contiguity. 
The mediational process is epitomized in S-R theorizing 
where the person is tabula rasa at birth (Locke) and 
external stimulations imprint themselves on the "blank 
slate" according to the principles of frequency and 
contiguity (Rychlak, in press). These stimuli or "inputs" 
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are taken into the process in the exact form they are 
"received." They become "mediators" within the process 
that can be shaped by new input and/or effect the output of 
subsequent responses. In the mediational model, meaning is 
shaped externally through efficient causation; the "person" 
plays no part in the process of meaning-creation or in 
directing his or her cognition. 
Current cognitive theories, such as the associative 
network model (Srull & Wyer, 1989) or the spreading 
activation model (Anderson, 1976) continue to be based on a 
mediational conception. For example, in the associative 
network model, an idea or concept is represented by a node 
that is connected to other nodes through "associative 
linkages" (Srull & Wyer, 1989, p. 59). According to this 
model, these associative linkages or pathways between 
concepts are established by "thinking of one concept in 
relation to another" (Srull & Wyer, 1989, p. 60). Further, 
the more frequently the concepts are considered together the 
stronger the association. Because the associative network 
model maintains an extraspective position in regard to idea 
formation, two concepts become associated to one another due 
to their juxtaposition rather than due to their meaningful 
relation to one another. This model, obviously, continues 
to use the "laws" of frequency and contiguity as the basis 
of thinking and idea formation. 
Most cognitive models today remain rooted in this 
efficient-causal, mediational process. Meaning is 
irrelevant to the process of cognition. Some cognitive 
theories do seem to be attempting to move into a more 
formal-cause view of cognition through the use of such 
concepts as "schema." However, schema are usually formed 
through a mediational process of association rather than 
because the individual ideas within the schema are 
meaningfully and logically related by the broader, more 
abstract meaning of the particular schematic concept. 
Basic Concepts of Logical Learning Theory 
12 
With an understanding of how the predicational model of 
explanation used in LLT differs from a mediational model of 
psychological explanation, some of the basic concepts of LLT 
can now be introduced. Logical Learning Theory assumes that 
the process of predication is present at birth. It is 
contended that through the process of predication, which 
encompasses oppositionality, a person is always able to 
frame and behave for the sake of alternative meanings 
regardless of the particular meaning "dictated" by his or 
her input history or genetic endowment. To differentiate 
itself from the extraspective, efficient-cause theories of 
human behavior, Rychlak (1988) has used the term telosponse, 
in order to be able to describe human behavior in formal-
and final-cause terms rather than using the term "response" 
which denotes the idea of being "shaped" (efficiently 
caused) over time. In order to understand humans as 
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teleological or telosponsive, the reader must be reminded 
that an introspective perspective is required. 
"Introspective" suggests that individually-determined 
meaning is fundamental. Rychlak (in press) defines 
telosponse as the "affirmation or taking of a position 
regarding a meaningful content Cimage[sJ, word[s], 
judgmental comparison[s], etc.) relating to a referent 
acting as a purpose for the sake of which behavior is then 
intended. Affirmation encompasses predication" (italics in 
the original). 
In relating to the world telosponsively, the person is 
always "taking a position" according to the matrix of 
meaningful patterns relevant to his or her current life 
situation. The "position" taken by the person telosponding 
is referred to as the premise, which is the "initiating 
meaning affirmed at the outset of thought" (Rychlak, in 
press) . The affirmed meaning extends "sequaciously" to 
create the context of thought, or, using the Euler circle 
example given above, affirmation involves "drawing" the 
larger circle, figuratively speaking, in which a narrower 
range of meaning is targeted (Rychlak, in press). 
The role of oppositionality is crucial to understanding 
the telosponder as an agent of his or her actions. Due to 
oppositionality in cognition (referred to in early LLT as 
"dialectical reasoning"; see Rychlak, 1988, p. 400), the 
person is intrinsically cognizant of the opposite meaning of 
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the premise under affirmation. According to Rychlak (in 
press), it is always possible for the telosponder to "take a 
contrary approach, frame a contradiction, express a 
contrast, or negate the grounds on which understanding- or 
action-intentions are based." 
Logical Learning Theory contends that the person can 
always oppose the "shaping" of biological and social 
determinants, even when such "opposition" could prove 
personally detrimental (Rychlak, in press). It is the 
person's ability to frame oppositional meanings that gives 
him or her the evaluative capacity to transcend any 
particular premise and frame the idea from a different point 
of view. In this way, humans are quite different from 
computers because they are able to draw implications from 
meanings that are not affirmed within the premise of a given 
telosponse. Further, humans are not restricted to one pole 
or the other of a dimension of meaning but can evaluate the 
meaning of a target along the entire dimension of the 
broader context of meaning (Rychlak, in press). This 
ability to transcend or examine meanings under consideration 
as well as examine the cognitive evaluative capacities 
themselves has been termed self-reflexivity, and this 
transcendental concept can be traced to the thought of Kant 
(Rychlak, 1988) . 
Affective Assessment 
Following from the transcendental capacity of humans to 
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evaluate actively the meanings under consideration in 
telosponsivity, LLT assumes that the person always renders 
judgment on the contents of cognition. The fundamental 
evaluating capacity of humans is considered by LLT to be 
affective assessment or affection. It is assumed that the 
person always evaluates the meanings within cognition as 
liked (positive evaluation) or disliked (negative 
evaluation) in nature. According to Rychlak (in press), 
"Affective assessment is a transcendental telosponse in 
which the person predicates meaningful contents of less 
abstract telosponses according to their positive or negative 
significance. This is an idiographic evaluation, completely 
unique to the individual making the judgment, although it is 
possible for people to predicate affectively in common 
(i.e., nomothetically) ." (italics in the original). 
Logical Learning Theory differentiates between an 
emotion and an affection. An emotion is considered to be a 
physiological phenomenon that "happens to us" in the Bios 
realm and to which we must assign a label in the Logos 
realm. Thus, the meaning of an emotion is always framed 
telosponsively, such that its meaning is encompassed within 
the content of particular semantic and affective 
predications in the mental realm (i.e., the Logos). In 
other words, an emotion is triggered automatically in the 
Bios realm by particular life circumstances, and, then, the 
telosponder endows the emotion with a particular meaning by 
conceptualizing and naming it (Rychlak, 1988, p. 319). 
Therefore, within LLT, emotions can provide the basis for 
affections, but they are far from being considered 
synonymous in the way the two terms are often used in 
psychological literature. The same emotional response can 
be understood positively or negatively depending on the 
frame of reference of a particular evaluator. 
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Affection is considered to be the most abstract 
predication in human cognition. The person not only frames 
a premise during telosponsivity but also "takes a position" 
on the meaning affirmed in the premise within the wider 
realm of positive/negative affection (Rychlak, in press). 
According to LLT, it would be unlikely for one to avoid 
rendering an affective assessment of a particular item of 
meaning under consideration. When one cannot state a 
particular affective preference, it is generally due to 
ambivalence, in which there are both positive and negative 
valuations of the item being considered (Rychlak, in press). 
A body of research has been undertaken by Rychlak and 
his colleagues to investigate the role of affective 
assessment on cognition as well as lend support to 
predication and oppositionality in human reasoning. 
Relevant LLT research will be reviewed in the next section. 
Empirical Factors 
Research in Logical Learning Theory 
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As mentioned above, the advocates of LLT have sought to 
establish an empirical basis for their theoretical point of 
view. In this section an effort will be made to review some 
of the research findings in LLT that prepared the way for 
the current study in affective predication. 
Affective assessment. Since affective assessment was 
seen as a fundamental process demonstrating that the person 
is able to influence his or her thinking, learning, and 
behavior independent of environmental influences, this was 
one of the first dimensions of LLT for which Rychlak and his 
colleagues sought to establish support (see Rychlak, 1988, 
Chapter 9 for a complete review of this research). 
Affective assessment is operationalized by taking an 
idiographic measurement in which subjects rate any item 
(e.g., word, picture, idea) in terms of its likability. 
Numerous studies have been done in which subjects were asked 
to rate all manner of items, such as consonant-vowel-
consonant (CVC) trigrams, words, paintings, modeled actions, 
and so forth, in terms of likability, and the relative 
learning of liked versus disliked items was assessed 
(Rychlak, 1988). In studies utilizing random selection of 
"normal" subjects, it was found that they learned their 
liked materials more readily than their disliked materials 
across test formats (e.g., recognition, free recall, paired 
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associates, serial learning formats, etc.). The criticism 
rendered towards these findings was that liked items were 
those with which subjects were most familiar. Therefore, 
critics were trying to subsume affective preference under 
the traditional Lockean "frequency of exposure" explanation. 
Thus, more studies were done, and these were able to show 
that affective assessment and association value (measure of 
an item's familiarity, frequency of past contact, 
meaningfulness, etc.) function independently of one another 
in learning (Rychlak, 1988). For example, Abramson, Tasto, 
and Rychlak (1969) compared idiographic affective assessment 
across levels of nomothetic association value using eve 
trigrams from the Archer (1960) norms. In this study, the 
"liked" over "disliked" rate of learning for the trigrams 
occurred independently of levels of association value. When 
idiographic affective assessment was compared to idiographic 
association value, there was again no statistical 
interaction between the two measures (Abramson, Tasto, & 
Rychlak, 1969). 
Rychlak and his colleagues conducted a series of 
further studies illustrating the influence of affection on 
learning as well as its independence from associative 
frequency in an effort to show that affective preference 
cannot be explained away by measures of meaningfulness that 
rely on some type of frequency count (for example, Rychlak, 
Galster, & McFarland, 1972; Rychlak, Flynn, & Burger, 
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1979). It is the contention of LLT that affective 
assessment is an evaluation rendered by the subject. It is 
a telosponsive action and not an automatic response to 
numerous past shapings (Rychlak, 1988). According to 
Rychlak (1988), "The point here is that if human beings do 
affectively assess even as they cognize experience, then it 
makes no difference whether their cognitive contents 
(thoughts, ideas, words, concepts, images, etc.) are 
familiar, clear, and distinct, or strange, vague, and 
tentative. People must be thought of as affectively 
choosing in every instance as they come to frame a premised 
meaning" (p. 370, italics in the original). 
Research in affective assessment became more 
interesting as LLT researchers began investigating the 
"oppositional" nature of cognitive evaluation. Earlier 
studies had been done with well-adjusted individuals who 
held generally positive attitudes toward the testing 
situation, and, as mentioned previously, the results showed 
"liked over disliked" learning. However, it followed from 
the theoretical position of LLT that the direction of this 
finding might be eclipsed or even reversed if the subjects 
who were tested disliked themselves, their life 
circumstances or the experimental situation. In other 
words, subjects would extend meaning more easily along the 
negative rather than the positive, if they were predicating 
their life or current situation negatively (Rychlak, 1988). 
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In the studies investigating this hypothesis, "disliked 
over liked" effects were found when acute and chronic 
psychotics (Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, & Abramson, 1971), 
depressed and alcoholic patients (Mosbacher, 1984), and 
depressed psychotherapy patients (Slife, Miura, Thompson, & 
Shapiro, 1984) were compared to yoked normal controls. 
Further, when normal subjects with a negative self-image 
were compared to those with a positive self-image, it was 
found that people with negative self-predications were more 
apt to learn along the negative whereas people with a 
positive self-predication learned more readily along the 
positive (August, Rychlak, & Felker, 1975; Rychlak, Carlsen, 
& Dunning, 1974). A person's affective predication of a 
particular life area was also found to influence the 
affective quality of what is learned. For example, it was 
revealed that the same individual can learn along the 
positive with words from one realm of meaning and learn 
along the negative with words from a different realm of 
meaning (Rychlak, Carlsen, & Dunning, 1974). Further, 
forcing subjects to perform a disliked task, results in the 
significant reduction in the "liked over disliked" learning 
effect (Rychlak & Marceil, 1986). 
Affection has also been shown to play a role in many 
other areas of behavior. For example, Gruba-Mccallister and 
Rychlak (1981) extended affective assessment to personality 
testing. It was found that if a well-adjusted individual 
likes a personality dimension on which he or she has a 
certain score, the person will be more likely to portray 
this personality-trait in his or her subsequent behaviors 
than to portray a trait related to a disliked personality 
dimension on which he or she earns the same score. 
According to Rychlak (in press), "[n]ormals more readily 
enact the personality styles that they have a positive 
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affection for in precedent-sequacious fashion." In another 
study investigating IQ testing, Rumsey and Rychlak (1978) 
found that subjects score about 5 IQ points higher when the 
estimate is restricted to Weschler IQ subtests that they 
like. Further, college students receive significantly 
higher grades on study topics that they like compared to 
those that they dislike with study time held constant (Slife 
& Rychlak, 1981). Another study investigating the modeling 
of aggressive behavior by grade school children revealed 
that the first and second graders modeled only those 
"aggressive" acts which they had rated as liked (Slife & 
Rychlak, 1982). Further, the only toys used in these 
modeled behaviors were those the children had rated as 
liked. 
Another area of research that has had significant 
relevance for affective predication has been mood induction 
research. In these type of studies, the approach has been 
to assist subjects into framing a positive or negative mood 
in order to investigate its effect on learning, memory, and 
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other behaviors (Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981). While much of 
this research has not been done directly by LLT advocates, 
most of the findings are consistent with the LLT point of 
view. Mood induction research has found that positive moods 
facilitate the recall of positive life situations and 
positive words as well as foster positive impression 
formation, and that negative moods engender the opposite 
effects. To interpret findings such as state-dependent 
memory facilitation, Bower (1981) has relied on a spreading 
activation model in which a mood is a node in the semantic 
network that "excites" memories to which it is linked in 
material-efficient causal fashion. Logical Learning Theory, 
on the other hand, would utilize a precedent-sequacious 
style of explanation based in the formal cause to understand 
these findings. Mood congruence between initial learning 
and recall would be seen as a recreation of the original 
predicational context. "A 'mood' is clearly a context 
meaning that is predicated by the person involved; and once 
affirmed, its meaning extends to what is then under 
continuing cognitive formulation" (Rychlak, in press). 
Lewis and Williams' (1989) study investigated the role 
of mood induction on recall using the affective 
predicational model of LLT. After having their subjects 
listen to a list of words (half of the list had been 
previously rated as positive and half rated as negative by 
the subjects) while under a positive or negative 
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hypnotically induced mood, the subjects were asked to recall 
as many words as possible. Mood was varied during recall in 
order to examine its effect with regard to the word ratings. 
The findings revealed that the facilitation in recall 
provided by a positive mood when trying to remember words 
which were also learned in a positive mood is due only to 
additional positive words being recollected and not negative 
words, and vice versa for the negative-mood recall 
situation. In other words, "state-dependent" recall 
facilitation occurred only with words whose affective 
meaning was also congruent with the affective valence of the 
mood. 
Oppositionality. After establishing that the 
oppositional construct of "affective assessment" (i.e., like 
vs. dislike) has a significant influence on human cognition 
and learning, the next step in the validation of LLT has 
been to design experiments investigating the two major 
constructs predication and oppositionality (see Rychlak, 
1988, Chapter 9 and Rychlak, in press, Chapters 5 & 6, for a 
review of this research). This section will provide a 
selective review of the research in oppositionality and will 
be followed by a section dealing with experiments exploring 
predication. 
One of the goals of a preliminary investigations into 
the role of oppositionality in cognition was to demonstrate 
the implicit oppositional nature of affective assessment. A 
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study was done in which subjects were requested to rate 
words in terms of affective assessment (Rychlak & Williams, 
1984). After determining the words which were rated as 
reliably liked or reliably disliked by each subject, the 
antonyms of these words were administered in a learning 
task. For example, if active and realistic were reliably 
rated as liked, then passive and idealistic were used in the 
learning task. The subjects did not rate or even see the 
antonyms prior to the learning tasks. A control subject was 
yoked to each experimental subject, such that he or she 
received the same antonyms but had not previously rated any 
of the words in terms of affective assessment. Therefore, 
it was anticipated that the cognitive organizations of the 
control subjects would not reflect the same affective 
patterning as the experimental subjects (Rychlak, 1992). 
The results confirmed the predictions that the "liked over 
disliked" learning facilitation would occur in a pattern 
opposite to the affective preratings for the experimental 
subjects, and that no such pattern would be found for the 
control subjects (Rychlak & Williams, 1984). Thus, the 
experimental subjects learned the initially unseen opposites 
of their disliked words more readily than the initially 
unseen opposites of their liked words. These results give 
evidence for the complex role oppositionality plays in 
people's cognitive organization. 
The next step in the LLT research effort to investigate 
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oppositionality was to go beyond the realm of affective 
assessment. To investigate the heuristic properties of 
oppositionality in memory, Rychlak, Williams, and Bugaj 
(1986) did a study in which college students were asked to 
learn a list of predications relating to imaginary people, 
identified only by name. Subjects were asked to memorize a 
list of names in terms of certain personality 
characterizations like the following series of predications: 
"Charles is quiet; Douglas is outspoken; Michael is 
outspoken; and Timothy is quiet." or "Valerie is cautious; 
Melissa is outspoken; Sherrie is outspoken; and Deborah is 
cautious." The first series sets up an oppositional context 
of meaning (i.e., quiet-outspoken), which LLT suggests is 
basic to cognitive organization, whereas the second series 
sets up a non-oppositional context (i.e., outspoken-
cautious). 
A set of eight male and eight female target names and 
four words from Anderson's (1968) norms (i.e., quiet, 
outspoken, bold, and cautious) were used to create eight 
different arrays of predications to be learned, half of 
which were oppositionally arrayed and the other half of 
which were non-oppositionally arrayed. As predicted, 
Rychlak et al. (1986) found that the oppositional 
organization of predications led to significantly faster 
learning (Q<.001) than the non-oppositional organization. 
To demonstrate further that the facilitation of 
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learning related to oppositional predication is not 
restricted to actual words, another experiment was done in 
which consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) trigrams were used as 
the targets and predicates in the predicational relations to 
be learned (Rychlak et al., 1986). For example, subjects 
learned the following series of predications: "HIB is 
always VIC; HIB is never QIN, HIB is sometimes YAT; and HIB 
is the opposite of JOQ." The target remained the same in 
each series while being presented in light of the four 
qualifying predications, so that the heuristic benefit of 
oppositionality could be examined. The results from two 
studies showed that opposite rank ordered as being the 
easiest predication to learn compared to always, never, and 
sometimes, respectively. In both studies, opposite was 
significantly different from never and sometimes, and in one 
of the studies, it was significantly different from all 
three of the other predications. Thus, Logical Learning 
Theory's contention that oppositionality is an important 
heuristic in human learning was supported. 
Slife, Stoneman, & Rychlak (1991) conducted another 
study illustrating the heuristic power of oppositionality in 
an incidental memory task. Two studies were conducted in 
which the subjects were asked to focus on a series of target 
words and evaluate whether they were similar in meaning to a 
predication word (e.g., friendly). The target words were 
divided into those that were similar in meaning to the 
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predicate word (e.g., congenial), those that were opposite 
in meaning (e.g., impolite), and those that were irrelevant 
in meaning (e.g., abstract). Following this task, the 
subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall as many words as 
possible that were relevant to the predication. In line 
with the experimental instructions, the majority of the 
words recalled were relevant (similar) to the predicating 
meaning. Immediately following the initial recall task, 
subjects were asked to recall "other words" from the list, 
and, as predicted, significantly more opposite than 
irrelevant words were recalled (p<.001) (Slife et al., 
1991) . Therefore, the heuristic pull of oppositionality in 
learning and memory was, again, demonstrated. Words which 
were oppositionally related to the predication were more 
easily remembered than those that were not related to it in 
a meaningful way. 
The final study to be presented in this selective 
review of research in oppositionality is considered to be 
pivotal to LLT because it establishes a "learning curve" for 
oppositionality (Rychlak, Barnard, Williams, & Wollman, 
1989). This study employed a recognition task involving 24 
brief sentences printed on cards. For instance, some of the 
sentences that were used included: "The ant crushed the 
rock," "The moon had insomnia," and "The elephant climbed 
the ladder" (Rychlak et al., 1989). The subjects were 
instructed to read the sentences aloud and were told that 
they would have to recognize these sentences later in the 
experiment. Subjects were assigned to either 1, 3, or 5 
exposure trials to the sentences. 
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After reading through the sentences, the subjects were 
given a recognition task according to the experimental 
condition to which they had been randomly assigned. 
subjects in the Identical condition were presented with 
their original 24 sentences mixed in with 24 other sentences 
which were matched to each of the original ones. For 
example, "The elephant danced the jig" would be matched with 
"the elephant climbed the ladder," so that the subjects 
would not simply have to remember "elephant," but were 
required to differentiate the actions of the elephant. 
Other subjects were assigned to the Paraphrase condition and 
were told they would have to identify a sentence that 
related the same meaning as their original sentence (e.g., 
"The elephant went up"). The third group of subjects were 
placed in the Opposite condition. They were told that they 
would have to recognize a sentence that was opposite in 
meaning to their original sentences (e.g., "The elephant 
went down"). The experimenters predicted that the subjects 
would be able to recognize the opposite phrasing as well as 
the paraphrasing and that the facility in recognizing 
oppositionality would increase with practice over trials. 
These predictions were confirmed (p<.05). Besides showing 
that people readily learn the opposite of meanings they are 
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asked to memorize, the researchers also demonstrated in the 
same series of studies that subjects recognize antonymy as 
readily as synonymy, that they utilize oppositionality to 
solve a problem as readily as they rely upon primacy/recency 
considerations, and that subjects can recognize opposite 
meanings of a prime sentence as rapidly as they recognize 
paraphrased meanings (Rychlak et al., 1989). 
Predication. To show the effect of predication in 
cognition, one line of research that has been explored has 
been the area of cued recall. Several experiments have been 
done to compare predicate-cueing versus subject-cueing in 
the recall of sentences (Rychlak, in press). If the 
sentence to be remembered was "John is reliable," predicate-
cueing would involve cueing the memory of the experimental 
subject for the sentence with the word "reliable." Subject-
cueing, on the other hand, would involve cueing the memory 
of the experimental subject with the word "John." Logical 
Learning Theory predicts that cueing people with the 
predicate will facilitate the reconceptualization of more 
sentences than cueing with the subject because the theory 
contends that meaning extends from the broader context to 
the targeted meaning, which, in this case, is the subject of 
the sentence. 
In one of the studies investigating predicate cueing 
and memory (Rychlak & Rychlak, 1986, cited in Rychlak, in 
press), the pattern of recall of an experimental group was 
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compared to a control group. In the experimental group, 
predicate versus subject-cueing in facilitating recall of 
sentences was examined, whereas in the control group, recall 
with word-associate pairings of the same nouns used in the 
sentences was examined. 
The experimental subjects were asked to read sentences 
and told they would have to remember them later. Some 
examples of the type of sentences that were used are "A 
ladder can be used as a bookshelf," "A rug can be used as a 
bedspread," and "A balloon can be used as a pillow" 
(Rychlak, in press) . After being given a free recall task 
for the sentences, the participants were administered a cued 
recall task and given a list of words, half of which were 
subjects (e.g, ladder, rug, balloon, etc.) and half of which 
were predicates (e.g., bookshelf, bedspread, pillow, etc.) 
of the experimental sentences. They were instructed to see 
if the words on the list engendered the reconceptualization 
(additional recall) of any sentences. 
The participants in the control group followed the same 
procedure as in the experimental group with the exception 
that they were administered only word pairs instead of 
sentences. For example, instead of the sentence, "A balloon 
can be used as a pillow," they were given balloon-pillow. 
The same word arrays for cued recall that were used for the 
experimental subjects were also used for the control 
subjects. 
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The results of this study were in line with the 
hypotheses. Predicate-cueing of the sentences was superior 
to subject-cueing, demonstrating the meaning-extension 
quality of the "predication effect" (Rychlak, in press) • 
Further, predicate cueing of the sentences resulted in 
significantly higher recall than both predicate- and 
subject-cueing of the word pairs. Thus, further credence 
was given to the importance of logical organization to 
memory, an idea that is neglected by the traditional view of 
association between words, which has proposed that the 
frequency of contiguous bondings of one word to another 
accounts for memory (Rychlak, in press) . 
In order to demonstrate that predication is not limited 
to the linguistic conventions of English syntax but rather 
to the semantics involved in human expression, another type 
of cued recall study was done using "triplets" (three-word 
units) (Stilson, 1988, cited in Rychlak, in press). In this 
study, it was predicted that cueing unrecalled "triplets" 
with the word having the broadest meaning would result in 
better recall than a cueing with words having a narrower 
range of meaning. It is assumed by LLT that the subjects 
would take the broadest word meaning as the framing 
predicate, such that in the triplet "nose, face, smile" the 
word "face" would be the most likely predicate meaning 
extending to target the other two words of the triplet 
(Rychlak, in press) . Again, the evidence gathered from this 
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study lent support for the predication effect in memory. 
The range of meaning-extension provided by cueing with the 
"predicate" word resulted in superior recall as compared to 
cueing with the "non-predicate" words. 
The final study to be presented in this section 
involves the investigation of affective predication at 
"encoding," and preceded the present studies exploring 
affective predication at "retrieval" (Rychlak, in press). 
It was the intent of this experiment to show that subjects 
are involved in affective assessment even before semantic 
learning occurs. To this end, a series of sentences 
describing a person were constructed, such as "When it comes 
to dancing, John is (graceful/clumsy)," or "When others are 
rude, John is (impolite/polite)" (Ulasevich, 1991). By 
completing the first example with "graceful," a positive 
predication of John's dancing was created. If "clumsy" was 
used to complete the sentence, a negative predication was 
created. The subjects were requested to learn a series of 
these statements, half of which were negative and half 
positive. They were administered the sentence stems in the 
manner of a paired-associates task and required to learn the 
word that completed the sentence to a learning criterion of 
two consecutive recollections of the entire list of 
sentences describing John. 
It was predicted that subjects would know the affective 
quality of the predicating word even before learning the 
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precise word meaning because affective predication provides 
a fundamental meaningful organization within which to target 
the semantic predication. Affection was a primary 
predication here, targeting the predicate word of the 
sentence, which in turn targeted the subject word. The 
findings of the experiment revealed that subjects were, in 
fact, generally able to grasp the affective quality of the 
word completing the sentence before they could state the 
actual word. Further, when the subjects completed the 
sentence with an incorrect word, it was affectively correct. 
Therefore, it seems that in the early stages of 
conceptualization (i.e., "encoding"), affection provides an 
initial meaningful organization, such that "the subjects 
knew affectively what they did not know verbally" (Rychlak, 
1992, p. 22). 
Affective Predication and Memory Retrieval: Introduction to 
the Present Studies 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of 
affective predication in memory. The review of the research 
in affective assessment and predication has already shown 
that affections have a significant impact on the course of 
learning and memory. Furthermore, studies of predication 
have demonstrated that the realm of meaning extending from 
the predicate "to" a target can provide a fertile 
organization from which to recall sentences and triplets 
that have been "lost" to short-term memory (Rychlak, in 
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press). In these experiments, words were used as both the 
broader predicate (larger Euler circle) and the more focused 
target. However, LLT would contend that the same "broader 
to narrower" process of predication also exists when 
affective assessment serves as the predicate and extends to 
a target. Therefore, after establishing that affection is 
significant to the process of conceptualization involved in 
the learning ("encoding") of word meanings (Ulasevich, 
1991), we considered the investigation of the role of 
affective predication in remembering ("retrieval") to be the 
next step in our efforts to validate LLT. 
Prior to introducing the rationale of the present 
experimental designs, a study done by Anderson and Pichert 
(1978) that has relevance to these experiments will be 
discussed. Their research revealed that previously 
unrecallable information could be remembered by subjects if 
they "shifted their perspective" (Anderson & Pichert, 1978). 
The subjects were asked to read a story describing details 
of a home from the perspective of either a burglar or a 
homebuyer. After being asked to recall the story once, the 
subjects were directed to shift their perspectives and 
recall the story again. The results from two such studies 
revealed that on the second recall the subjects remembered a 
significant amount of additional information related to the 
second perspective that had been unimportant to the first. 
These researchers interpreted these findings as evidence for 
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the operation of "retrieval processes" independent of 
"encoding processes" (Anderson & Pichert, 1978, p. 10). By 
having subjects shift their "perspective," they contended 
that a different schema was invoked, which provided implicit 
cues for the retrieval of previously unrecalled story 
information. Of course, no claim is being suggested here 
that the subjects intentionally shifted their predicating 
schema in shifting perspectives; presumably, the schema 
shift was done as a mediational mechanism brought on by the 
prompting from the experimental instructions. 
Logical Learning Theory would interpret these findings 
with the idea that a shift from the perspective of a burglar 
to that of a homebuyer (or vice versa) establishes a new 
predicational realm of meaning (formal-cause pattern) within 
which the subject targets information that is meaningfully 
relevant to the new predication. However, we would concur 
with Anderson and Pichert (1978) in their statement 
regarding their findings that the "principle of encoding 
specificity does not extend in a simple way" (p. 10). 
Following from LLT's tenet that humans are active, meaning-
creating beings, it is also our contention that the 
effectiveness of a cue in the retrieval of information is 
not solely tied to its state of representation at encoding, 
contrary to the state-dependent retention model of Tulving & 
Thomson (1973). The process of oppositionality allows the 
person to have an active conceptualization of meaningful 
information being cognized, such that his or her 
"reconceptualization" of it is not restricted to the 
specific form to which the meanings are aligned at 
"encoding." 
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To extend this type of thinking into our investigation 
of affective predication, we had our subjects think of a 
person whom they like or dislike. Thus, the subjects 
"affirmed" affection (liking versus disliking) as the broad 
realm of meaning in which to target the person they 
selected. We then asked subjects to select adjectives that 
were descriptive of their targeted person. By asking the 
subjects to consider their chosen person in light of these 
personality-trait words, we were essentially asking the 
subjects to select adjectival predicates. We thought of 
these adjectival descriptors as "secondary predications" of 
the target. The secondary predications would, in turn, be 
targeted by the more abstract realm of the "primary 
predication" of affective assessment (Rychlak, in press). 
According to LLT, "any predicate meaning can itself be the 
target of an even broader or more abstract predication" 
(Rychlak, in press) . 
Based on research cited earlier in this paper, we 
assumed that when giving the subjects a recall task for 
their descriptive adjectives, positive adjectives would be 
remembered for liked targets and negative adjectives would 
be remembered for disliked targets. This follows from the 
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assumption that the quality of the primary predication 
extends into the secondary predications to target the 
particular person. This finding in itself would not be 
particularly remarkable. However, in the pivotal part of 
the experiment, we asked subjects to reverse their primary 
predications (i.e., from liked to disliked, or vice versa), 
after giving them the opportunity to recall all of the 
adjectives serving as secondary predications as well as any 
other adjectives that they could remember from the task. 
once the subjects had targeted another person within their 
new predication, we asked them to reconsider the list of 
adjectives and recall any that related to their new target. 
It is our prediction that this "re-predication" would 
facilitate the recall of secondary predications targeting 
the newly framed person that were affectively consistent 
with the shift in predication. Therefore, after a shift 
from a liked person to a disliked person, subjects would be 
considering a new target framed within the realm of a 
negative predication, which would allow them to "retrieve" 
previously unrecalled words having negative meaning. 
In a second experiment, we sought to cross-validate 
findings from our first experiment as well as determine the 
effects on recall of the affectively-valenced adjectives if 
we also provided the context of an affectively-valenced 
social situation. We felt that this might provide an 
additional realm of predication in which to target the 
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person. Our line of thinking, in this case, was that the 
addition of a social situation might create a more elaborate 
meaningful context that could enhance or diminish the 
positive versus negative word differences in recall. We 
felt that when the affective valence of the social situation 
was consistent with the primary predication (liked or 
disliked) under consideration during a particular recall 
task, more affectively-consistent adjectives might be 
recalled compared to when the affective valence of the 
social situation was inconsistent with the primary 
predication. 
CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT I 
Statement of the Problem 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: In an incidental memory task 
following the selection of descriptors, subjects who 
have targeted a liked person will recall more positive 
than negative descriptors, and vice versa for subjects 
who have targeted a disliked person. Recall of 
ambivalent descriptors should not reflect the predicted 
pattern of recall for the positive and negative 
descriptors. 
Hypothesis II: In a second recall task for words 
that were not selected as descriptive of the targeted 
person, the pattern of recall for positive, negative, 
and ambivalent unselected words should array as 
predicted for Hypothesis I. 
Hypothesis III: After having the opportunity to 
recall as many of both selected and unselected 
descriptors as possible, subjects who are then asked to 
shift their affective predication and target a person 
who is opposite to their initial selection will 
retrieve descriptors that they have not previously 
recalled which are consistent with the shift in 
predication. In other words, subjects who are now 
targeting a disliked (rather than a liked) person will 
recall negative descriptors not previously remembered. 
Subjects who have shifted to a liked person will recall 
positive descriptors that were not previously 
remembered. 
Rationale: 
Hypotheses I and II follow from the basic tenets of LLT 
discussed in the introduction, where previous research has 
shown that affective predication is the broadest realm of 
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meaning through which individuals organize their experience. 
Thus, it is predicted that descriptive words targeting the 
person which have an affective valence that is consistent 
with the valence of the predicational context of liking or 
disliking will be better remembered than words that are 
inconsistent with the broader affective context. In a true 
sense, the descriptive words {the secondary predications) 
are targeted by the same predicational context of liking or 
disliking {the primary predication) as the targeted person 
because LLT holds that broader, more abstract predications 
subsume other narrower predications framing a target. 
If this were to be depicted with Euler circles, the 
primary predication {"like" or "dislike") would be 
represented by a large Euler circle. Within this circle 
there would be a number of secondary predications, featured 
as overlapping smaller circles labeled by the descriptive 
adjectives. In the "liked person" condition, we would find 
such overlappings as the following: generous, wise, 
responsible, happy, and so forth. In the "disliked person" 
condition, we might find overlapping circles labeled 
hostile, cruel, lazy, etc .. Encircled within these 
overlapping secondary predications would be a very small 
circle {or a "dot") that would represent the specific person 
under description {referred to as the "target" in LLT). 
Hypothesis III is derived from the LLT line of thinking 
that information from experience is organized by the person 
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in an active manner. It suggests that retrieval of 
information from memory is related to the meaning of a 
person's framing organization--that is, predication--rather 
than it being passively restricted to the form in which the 
information was initially "encoded." Therefore, following 
the opportunity to recall all of the secondary predications 
framing the targeted person that can be remembered as well 
as any other personality descriptors that can be remembered, 
LLT would predict that having the subjects reverse their 
primary predications might facilitate the memory of 
previously unrecalled adjectives that have relevance as 
secondary predications to the new target. 
Method 
Subjects 
Sixty-four introductory psychology students (38 
females, 24 males) from Loyola University of Chicago 
voluntarily participated in the study. Informed consent was 
obtained from the subjects, and they received course credit 
for their participation. The subjects were tested in small 
groups and each was randomly assigned to one of the two 
between-subjects conditions. 
Materials 
Each subject received a packet consisting of six 
sections (eight pages), a three inch by five inch white 
index card, and a pen. The experimenter used the same 
,. 
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prepared set of instructions for each group tested and timed 
the 10-second intervals between word-pairs with a stopwatch. 
The experimenter's instructions to subjects can be found in 
Appendix A and a sample experimental packet can be found in 
Appendix B. 
The words used as personality descriptors were taken 
from the Anderson (1968) norms for personality-trait words. 
The association value of the selected words was controlled 
for by selecting words of equivalent usage frequency. 
Twenty personality-trait words were taken from the "high" 
likability category (e.g., enthusiastic, sincere, happy, 
etc.) of the Anderson norms, twenty from the midrange (e.g., 
philosophical, modest, cautious, etc.), and twenty from the 
"low" likability category (e.g., careless, boring, 
unethical, etc.). 
The twenty words from each of the three word categories 
that were used in the experiment were taken from a larger 
group of "high", "medium", and "low" likability words. The 
larger group of words were judged by 5 independent raters in 
order to determine those words which were positive, 
ambivalent, and negative in meaning, respectively. 
(Ambivalent, in this case, is defined as not clearly 
positive or negative in meaning.) The judges rated words on 
a 7-point scale with 11 1 11 representing "very positive" and 
"7" representing "very negative." The "high" likability 
words that had a mean rating nearest to 11 1 11 were used as 
r 
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positive words, the "medium" likability words that had a 
mean rating nearest to "4" were used as ambivalent words, 
and the "low" likability words that had a mean rating 
nearest to "7" were used as negative words. The average 
mean ratings (with standard deviations) of each of the three 
types of words were as follows: positive words M = 1.2 (SD 
= o.18), negative words M = 6.6 (SD= 0.28), and ambivalent 
words M = 3.8 (SD= 0.56). A list of the words used can be 
found in Appendix C. 
In the subjects' packets, the 60 descriptors used for 
the word selection procedure were arrayed in three random 
orders of word pairings and sequence and were displayed to 
the subjects as seen in Section Three of the experimental 
packet (Appendix A) . These differently ordered lists were 
randomly distributed across the groups tested. The 30 word-
pairs in each list consisted of 10 positively-valenced word 
pairings, 10 negatively-valenced word pairings, and 10 
ambivalent pairings. For example, typical word-pairs would 
be sincere and cheerful (positive), pessimistic and careless 
(negative), and philosophical and informal (ambivalent). 
The personality descriptors were placed in pairs, and the 
subjects were instructed to select one word from each pair 
as more descriptive of their targeted person in a forced-
choice format. This ensured that all subjects selected 10 
positive, 10 negative, and 10 ambivalent words as 
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descriptors, and 10 of each type of the affectively-valenced 
words remained "unselected" as descriptors. 
g_rocedure 
Tested in small groups of three to eight participants, 
the subjects were asked to read and sign an informed consent 
form and asked not to put their names on any part of the 
packet so that their responses would remain anonymous and 
confidential. Each subject was given an experimental packet 
of six sections and instructed not to move on to another 
page of the packet until directed by the experimenter. 
Section One. With the first page of the packet labeled 
"Section One" facing the subjects, they were told that the 
experimenters were studying the personality characteristics 
of certain types of people. They were then directed to read 
and follow the instructions printed on the page. These 
instructions required the subjects to think of a person whom 
they affectively predicated in either a strongly positive or 
negative way (between-groups condition). Subjects in one 
experimental group were asked to think of someone they liked 
very much, while subjects in the other experimental group 
were asked to think of someone whom they disliked very much. 
This procedure allowed the broader realm of meaning of the 
primary predication of liking and disliking to target onto 
the narrower realm of meaning embodied by a specific person, 
thereby operationalizing affective predication. Subjects 
recorded the initials of the person whom they had predicated 
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as liked or disliked on the page. When the subjects 
completed this task, they were instructed to turn to Section 
Two of their packet. 
Section Two. This section provided a warm-up, practice 
task for the subjects on the personality-trait selection 
procedure that was going to occur in Section Three. The 
subjects were, first of all, asked to place the three inch 
by five inch index card vertically under the first word-pair 
(i.e., "efficient" and ''good-tempered") in a list of three 
word-pairs and instructed not to move to the next word-pair 
until told to do so. The subjects were then asked to decide 
which of the two words was more descriptive or 
characteristic of the person whose initials they wrote on 
the first page and to place a check mark next to that word. 
This procedure allowed the subjects to select the word in 
each pair that provided the better ''secondary predication" 
in which to target their person. They were given 10 seconds 
to make their decision before the experimenter began reading 
the next word-pair, which signaled the subjects to move 
their card to it. The experimenter read the word-pairs 
aloud in order to aid and encourage the subjects to keep 
their place on the word list. 
The experimenter explained to the subjects that Section 
Three would contain 30 pairs of personality characteristics 
similar to the pairs on that page. They were asked if they 
had any questions at this point. The experimenter reminded 
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them of the selection procedure that was used in the 
practice task and, again, cautioned them not to move to a 
new word-pair until directed to do so by the experimenter. 
After any questions were answered, the subjects were told to 
turn the page to Section Three and to place their index card 
under the first word on the list. 
Section Three. After the subjects placed their index 
cards under the first word-pair in Section Three, the 
experimenter read off the word-pairs at a 10-second rate 
according to the particular random order used for the group 
that was being tested. As soon as the 10-second interval 
had passed for the last word-pair in the list, the 
experimenter directed the subjects to turn to the next 
section of their packet. 
Section Four. Having made certain that all of the 
subjects had turned the previous section-pages of their 
packets over so that they were out of view, the experimenter 
asked them to record as many of the words which they had 
selected in the previous section as being descriptive of 
their person as they could remember on the blank space 
provided in Section Four. They were given five minutes to 
write down all the words they could remember. Pretesting 
had established that five minutes was an adequate time 
period for free recall, yet prevented subjects from rushing 
through the experimental tasks without the necessary effort. 
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At the end of five minutes, subjects were instructed to move 
to section Five of their packets. 
Section Five. For Section Five of the experimental 
packet, the subjects were instructed to record any other 
words that they could remember from Section Three (i.e., any 
words that they did not check as descriptive of their 
person) on a blank space provided. This task was given in 
order to make certain all of the words that a subject might 
have recalled from the Section Three checking task were in 
fact recalled. Therefore, it could be surmised that, at 
this point in the experiment, the subjects had recorded in 
writing all the words they could remember or "retrieve" for 
this particular experimental task. Again, five minutes was 
allowed to complete this task, after which the subjects were 
instructed to turn to Section Six of their packet. 
Section Six. For the final section of the packet, the 
subjects were asked to read the instructions at the top of 
the page and to follow them accordingly. These instructions 
directed them to shift their primary predication by 
selecting another person. The subjects who had originally 
thought of a person whom they liked very much were now asked 
to think of a person they disliked very much, and vice versa 
for the subjects who initially targeted a person they 
disliked. They were asked to concentrate on this new person 
for a few moments and to reconsider the list of descriptive 
adjectives in light of this new person. The subjects were 
r 
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then asked to record any words they remembered that 
described this new person. This was done in order to 
determine if the shift in affective predication would 
engender the retrieval of new descriptors that meaningfully 
related to this new target (i.e., words with a valence which 
was affectively consistent with the affective assessment of 
the new person). After the subjects were allowed five 
minutes to complete the last task, they were given a 
debriefing statement explaining the nature of the experiment 
(see Appendix D). When they had finished reading the 
debriefing statement, the subjects were free to leave. 
Results 
To examine the effect of affectively framing a 
particular targeted person on the recall of affectively-
valenced personality-trait words, the dependent variables in 
this experiment were the number of words recalled in each of 
three categories: (1) positive words, (2) negative words, 
and (3) ambivalent words. The number of words recalled from 
the three wordtype categories was tabulated for each of the 
three recall tasks in the experiment. The data were 
analyzed by a 2 X 3 factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The first variable was between-subjects with two conditions, 
"Liked Target" and "Disliked Target," and the within-
subjects variable was the three affective types of 
adjectives. The three wordlist conditions (the three random 
orderings and random pairings of the words) were combined 
across the independent variable of Liked/Disliked target 
because no significant effects were found for list. 
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When tabulating the words according to the three 
categories of affective wordtype, misspellings of the 
experimental words were allowed provided that the words were 
recognizable. Intrusions (words that were not on the list 
and that should not have been recalled) were tabulated, but 
were excluded from the analyses. The mean number of 
intrusions calculated for each of the three recall tasks 
were as follows: first recall task M = 0.67 (SD= 0.99), 
second recall task M = 0.66 (SD= 0.96), and third recall 
task M = 0.69 (SD = 0.87). 
Hypothesis I predicted that in the incidental recall 
task following the selection of adjectival descriptors, the 
subjects who had targeted a liked person would remember more 
positive than negative words, and vice versa for the 
subjects who had targeted a disliked person (i.e., Target X 
Wordtype interaction). This hypothesis was tested further 
with the simple effects comparisons of the mean number of 
words recalled according to affective valence (positive, 
negative, and ambivalent) for the "Liked" and "Disliked 
Target" conditions. The omnibus .E-test from the 2 
(Liked/Disliked target) X 3 (affective wordtype) factorial 
analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction for 
affective wordtype by Liked/Disliked target condition, 
F(2,124) = 19.56, Q < .0001, in support of the 
hypothesis. 
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The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Liked Target'' condition was significant, E(2,124) = 11.29, 
Q < .001, with the recall data arraying as follows: 
positive words M = 3.10 (SD= 1.58), negative words M = 1.55 
(SD= 1.41), ambivalent words M = 2.29 (SD= 1.62) (refer to 
Table 1). Scheffe's test for comparing means was performed 
to evaluate the differences between the affective wordtype 
means for this condition. These comparisons revealed that 
positive words (M = 3.10) were recalled more often than 
negative words (M = 1.55), E(2,124) = 22.57, Q < .001, that 
there was a trend towards positive words (M = 3.10) being 
recalled more often than ambivalent words (M = 2.29), 
E(2,124) = 6.12, Q < .10, and that there was no significant 
difference in recall between negative and ambivalent words, 
E(2,124) = 5.18, n.s .. 
TABLE 1 
EXPERIMENT I: 
RECALL TASK FOR WORDS DESCRIPTIVE OF THE TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF 
LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET AND AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITION 
Positive 
Words 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
Negative 
Words 
Ambivalent 
Words 
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Liked Target 
Disliked Target 
3.10 (1.58) 
1.21 (1.05) 
1.55 (1.41) 
2.48 (1.50) 
2.29 (1.62) 
2.09 (1.25) 
The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Disliked Target" condition was significant, f(2,124) = 
8.51, 2 < .001, with the recall data arraying as follows: 
positive words M = 1.21 (SD= 1.05), negative words M = 2.48 
(SD= 1.50), and ambivalent words M = 2.09 (SD= 1.25) 
(refer to Table 1). Scheffe's test for comparing means was 
performed to evaluate the differences between the affective 
wordtype means for this condition. These comparisons 
revealed that negative words (M =2.48) were recalled more 
often than positive words (M = 1.21), f(2,124) = 16.24, 2 < 
.001, that ambivalent words (M = 2.09) were recalled more 
often than positive words (M = 1.21), f(2,124) = 7.74, 2 < 
.05, and that there was no significant difference in recall 
between negative and ambivalent words, f(2,124) = 1.56, 
n.s .. Thus, the results for the "Liked" and "Disliked 
Target" conditions support Hypothesis I. 
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Hypothesis II predicted that, in a recall task for 
words not selected as descriptive of the target, the pattern 
of recall for positive, negative, and ambivalent words 
should array as it did for Hypothesis I, with an interaction 
between Target and Wordtype. The second hypothesis was also 
tested with the simple effects comparisons of the mean 
number of words recalled according to affective valence for 
the "Liked" and "Disliked Target" conditions. The omnibus 
E-test from the 2 X 3 factorial analysis of variance 
revealed a significant interaction for affective wordtype by 
Liked/Disliked target condition, E(2,124) = 10.74, Q < 
.0001. 
The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Liked Target" condition was significant, E(2,124) = 3.24, Q 
< .05, with the recall data arraying as follows: positive 
words M = 1.19 (SD= 1.08), negative words M = 1.84 (SD= 
1.42), and ambivalent words M = 1.19 (SD= 0.87) (refer to 
Table 2). Scheffe's test for comparing means was performed 
to evaluate the differences between the affective wordtype 
means for the this condition. Scheffe's tests indicated 
that no significant differences were observed between any of 
the pairs of means (Q > .05). 
TABLE 2 
EXPERIMENT I: 
RECALL TASK FOR WORDS NOT DESCRIPTIVE OF THE TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF 
LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET AND AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITION 
Positive 
Words 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
Negative 
Words 
Ambivalent 
Words 
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Liked Target 
Disliked Target 
1.19 (1.08) 
1.94 (1.41) 
1.84 (1.42) 
0.70 (0.88) 
1.19 (0.87) 
1.00 (1.12) 
The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Disliked Target'' condition was significant, E(2,124) = 
10.45. 2 < .001, with the recall data arraying as follows: 
positive words M = 1.94 (SD= 1.41), negative words M = 0.70 
(SD= 0.88), and ambivalent words M = 1.00 (SD= 1.12) 
(refer to Table 2). Scheffe's test for comparing means was 
performed to evaluate the differences between the affective 
wordtype means for this condition. These comparisons 
revealed that positive words (M = 1.94) were recalled more 
frequently than negative words (M = 0.70), E(2,124) = 19.21, 
2 < .001, that positive words (M = 1.94) were also recalled 
more frequently than ambivalent words (M = 1.00), E(2,124) = 
10.98, 2 < .01, and that there was no significant difference 
in recall between negative and ambivalent words, E(2,124) = 
1.14, n.s .. Thus, these results for the "Liked" and 
"Disliked Target" conditions did not not support Hypothesis 
II. 
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Hypothesis III predicted that, after subjects had 
shifted their affective predication to the opposite and 
targeted a new person, they would recall words affectively 
consistent with the new predication that were not previously 
recalled on the first two recall tasks, as indicated by a 
Target by Wordtype interaction. This hypothesis was tested 
with the simple effects comparisons of the mean number of 
previously unremembered words recalled according to the 
shift in affective valence for the ''Liked" and "Disliked 
Target" conditions. The omnibus E-test from the 2 X 3 
factorial analysis of variance revealed a significant 
interaction for affective wordtype by Liked/Disliked target 
condition, E(2,124) = 50.76, R < .0001. 
There was also an unpredicted main effect for affective 
wordtype, E(2,124) = 6.60, R < .01. In order to investigate 
the means of the number of words recalled according to the 
three categories of affective wordtype collapsed across 
Liked/Disliked target, Scheffe's test of comparing means was 
performed and revealed that positive words (M = 0.81) were 
recalled more frequently than ambivalent words (M = 0.36), 
E(2,124) = 10.73 R < .01, that negative words (M = 0.77) 
were also recalled more frequently than ambivalent words (M 
= 0.36), E(2,124) = 8.63, R < .05, and that there was no 
significant difference in recall between positive and 
negative words, l(2,124) = 0.11, n.s •• 
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Following up on the significant target X affective 
wordtype interaction to lend support for Hypothesis III, the 
simple effects test of affective wordtype for the "Liked 
Target" condition (after a shift to a disliked target) was 
significant, ~(2,124) = 30.41, 2 < .0001, with the recall 
data arraying as follows: positive words M = 0.03 (SD = 
0.18), negative words M = 1.52 (SD= 1.29), and ambivalent 
words M = 0.39 (SD = 0.62) (refer to Table 3). Scheffe's 
test for comparing means was performed to evaluate the 
differences between the affective wordtype means for this 
condition. These comparisons revealed that negative words 
(M = 1.52) were newly recalled more than both positive words 
(M = 0.03), ~(2,124) = 55.75, 2 < .001, as well as 
ambivalent words (M = 0.39), ~(2,124) = 32.28, 2 < .001, and 
that there was no significant difference in recall between 
previously unrecalled positive and ambivalent words, 
~(2,125) = 3.19, n.s .. 
TABLE 3 
EXPERIMENT I: 
PREVIOUSLY UNRECALLED WORDS DESCRIPTIVE OF THE NEW TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
SHIFT IN LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET AND AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
SHIFT IN TARGET Positive 
CONDITIONS Words 
Liked to Disliked 0.03 (0.18) 
Disliked to Liked 1.45 (1.20) 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
Negative 
Words 
1.52 (1.29) 
0.15 (0.36) 
Ambivalent 
Words 
0.39 (0.62) 
0.33 (0.54) 
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The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Disliked Target" condition (after a shift to a liked 
target} was significant, E(2,124} = 26.85, 2 < .0001, with 
the recall data arraying as follows: positive words M = 
1.45 (SD= 1.20), negative words M = 0.15 (SD= 0.36), and 
ambivalent words M = 0.33 (SD= 0.54). Scheffe's test for 
comparing means was performed to evaluate the differences 
between the affective wordtype means for this condition. 
These comparisons revealed that positive words CM = 1.45) 
were newly recalled more than both negative words CM = 
0.15), E(2,124} = 45.77, 2 < .001, as well as ambivalent 
words CM= 0.33), E(2,124} = 33.89, 2 < .001, and that there 
was no significant difference in recall between previously 
unrecalled negative and ambivalent words, E(2,124} = 0.89, 
n.s .. 
The findings related to Hypothesis III can also be 
considered in terms of the percentage of subjects who 
retrieved adjectives that they had not previously recalled. 
When the new target was liked, 79% of the subjects recalled 
between one and six additional positive adjectives (Mode = 
2). Fifteen percent of the subjects recalled one negative 
adjective when the new target was liked, and 26% of the 
sample recalled one or two ambivalent adjectives (Mode = 1). 
When the shift in affective predication was to disliked, 71% 
of the subjects recalled between one and five additional 
negative adjectives (Mode= 2). Only one subject (3%) 
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recalled a single positive adjective when the the new target 
was disliked. Thirty-two percent of the subjects recalled 
either one or two additional ambivalent adjectives which 
could predicate the new target (Mode = 1) . 
Conclusion 
Both Hypotheses I and III were confirmed. In the 
recall task for words descriptive of the target, subjects 
who targeted a liked person recalled more positive than 
negative descriptors, and those who targeted a disliked 
person recalled more negative than positive descriptors. 
Further, after targeting a new person and shifting the 
affective predication to the opposite, the subjects 
remembered previously unrecalled descriptors that were 
affectively consistent with the new predication. Those 
subjects shifting from a liked person to a disliked person 
recalled more negative words that had not been previously 
remembered and vice versa for those shifting from a disliked 
to a liked person. 
Hypothesis II was not confirmed. For both the "Liked" 
and the "Disliked Target" condition, the means for the 
affectively-valenced descriptors arrayed in the opposite 
direction to the predicted effect. When remembering words 
from the selection task that were not descriptive of the 
target, more positive than negative unselected words were 
recalled by the subjects in the "Disliked Target" condition. 
Even though the differences between means from this recall 
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task were not significant for the "Liked Target" condition, 
the pattern of recall for affectively-valenced words also 
reflected the same ordering of means found for the "Disliked 
Target" condition, which is, again, opposite to the 
predicted effect. 
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT II 
Statement of the Problem 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: The experimental hypotheses from 
Experiment I will be enhanced if the liked or disliked 
person targeted is thought of in a (positive or 
negative) social situation. In the first two recall 
tasks in which the subjects were asked to remember 
descriptive adjectives, it is predicted that when the 
affective assessment of the targeted person is 
consistent with the affective quality of a scene 
described to the subjects, the recall for affectively 
consistent descriptors should be greater than if the 
affective quality of the scene is inconsistent with the 
broader affective predication. 
Hypothesis II: After the subjects have reversed 
their affective predication and have targeted a new 
person, it is predicted that consistency between the 
affective assessment of the new person and the 
affective quality of the setting will facilitate the 
recall of previously unrecalled descriptors compared to 
when they are affectively inconsistent. 
Hypothesis III: Experiment II should replicate 
the three hypotheses from Experiment I (refer above). 
Rationale: 
Hypotheses I and II were developed from the premises of 
LLT. They follow from the idea that with the affective 
assessment of the person serving as the primary predication 
targeting the person, a social situation which is 
affectively consistent would also be subsumed under the 
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primary predication and, therefore, would provide a more 
meaningfully-related pattern from which to influence the 
recall of affectively-consistent descriptors serving as 
secondary predications. 
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As was already mentioned above, affective assessment 
targets both the secondary adjectival predications and the 
person, but people also are generally encountered in social 
situations. Therefore, it is possible that by adding an 
additional secondary predication, such as the social 
situation in which the liked or disliked person is 
encountered, the memory for the descriptors might be 
enhanced. In the study to follow, subjects thought of a 
liked person as encountered in the positive social setting 
of an award dinner compared to subjects who thought of the 
liked person as encountered in the negative social setting 
of a hospital waiting room or the ambivalent social setting 
of a classroom. 
In terms of Hypothesis I, for example, subjects who 
targeted a liked person and were asked to think of this 
person in a positive social situation were predicted to 
recall the most positive words compared to the subjects 
whose targeted liked person is thought of in a negative or 
ambivalent social situation. Subjects who targeted a 
disliked person should recall more negative descriptors if 
the target is pictured in a negative rather than positive or 
ambivalent social situation. Furthermore, for Hypothesis 
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II, when the primary predication shifts from liked to 
disliked, more new words should be recalled with a negative 
setting than a positive or ambivalent setting, whereas when 
the shift is from disliked to liked, the positive setting 
might be more facilitative of recall. 
Hypothesis III follows from the rationale provided in 
Experiment I. 
Method 
Subiects 
One hundred and three introductory psychology students 
(79 females, 24 males) from Loyola University of Chicago 
voluntarily participated in the study. Informed consent was 
obtained from the subjects, and they received course credit 
for their participation. The subjects were tested in small 
groups and were randomly assigned to the conditions 
representing two between-subjects variables. The subject 
groups were randomly assigned to one of the "positive 
setting," "negative setting," and "ambivalent setting" 
conditions, as well as to one of the "Liked Target" and 
"Disliked Target conditions in a factorial design. 
Materials 
As in the first experiment, each subject received a 
packet consisting of six sections, a three inch by five inch 
white index card, and a writing instrument. The 
experimenter used the same prepared set of instructions for 
each group tested and timed the 10-second intervals between 
word-pairs with a stopwatch. For the experimenter's 
instructions to subjects and a sample experimental packet, 
refer to Appendices A and B, respectively. 
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The words used as personality descriptors in Experiment 
I were also used in Experiment II. These words were taken 
from Anderson (1968) norms for personality-trait words. The 
association value of the selected words was controlled by 
selecting words of equivalent usage frequency. The reader 
may refer to Experiment I for the method to select the list 
of 60 personality descriptors that were used in the 
experiment. The reader will be reminded, however, that the 
60 words used were rated nomothetically, so that there were 
20 that were considered positive in meaning, 20 that were 
negative, and 20 that were ambivalent. A list of the words 
used can be found in Appendix C. 
The positive, ambivalent, and negative settings 
consisted of short paragraphs describing the scene of a 
social situation. The positive setting described an award 
dinner, in which the subject was instructed to imagine that 
he or she is being given an award. It contains such phrases 
as "you are being honored by your peers," "you are filled 
with personal pride ... ," and "The conversation is flowing, 
the food is delicious, and everyone is enjoying 
themselves ...• " A hospital waiting room was described in 
the negative setting. Some of the statements included in 
this scene were "Someone you care about deeply is very ill," 
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"You are extremely worried and concerned," and "Consumed 
with worry and fatigue, you slump down in a chair." For the 
ambivalent setting, a classroom situation was described. In 
this description, positive and negative statements were 
juxtaposed to create the feeling of ambivalence. For 
example, "Even though you are tired, you are ready for class 
to start because today's topic is of particular interest to 
you." 
The positive setting consisted of an equivalent number 
of positive words or statements as the negative setting had 
negatives words or statements. The ambivalent setting 
consisted of an equivalent number of both positive and 
negative statements, which were balanced. The ambivalent 
setting had the same number of statements as in the positive 
and negative settings. For the complete descriptions used 
to create the social situations, refer to Appendix E. 
Procedure 
Tested in small groups of three to eight people, the 
subjects were asked to read and sign an informed consent 
form and asked not to put their names on any part of the 
packet so that their responses would remain anonymous and 
confidential. Each subject was given an experimental packet 
of six sections (the same experimental packet as was used in 
Experiment I) and instructed not to move on to another page 
of the packet until directed by the experimenter. 
, 
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section One. With the first page of the packet labeled 
"Section One" facing the subjects, they were taken through 
the initial procedure as used in the first experiment to 
select a particular person whom they framed in either a 
strongly positive or a strongly negative way depending on 
which between-subjects condition they were randomly 
assigned. (Please refer to Experiment I, Section One 
procedure above.) However, in Experiment II the subjects 
were asked to sit back, relax a few moments, and close their 
eyes before turning to Section Two of their packets. At 
this time, the experimenter told them to concentrate 
carefully on the scene that she was about to read aloud. 
When the subjects seemed comfortable, the experimenter read 
either the positive, negative, or ambivalent setting 
description depending on the particular between-groups 
condition to which they were randomly assigned. After the 
social scene was read to the subjects, the experimenter 
asked the subjects to remain relaxed with their eyes closed 
while they imagined their targeted person sitting next to 
them in the scene described. It was hoped that the setting 
would give another meaningful secondary predication in which 
to target their selected person. After the subjects had 
focused on the scene, the experimenter directed them to 
Section Two of their packets. 
Section Two. This section again provided a practice 
task for the word selection procedure that was to follow in 
65 
section Three. The reader is referred to Section Two above 
for a full description of the procedure. 
Section Three. Again, the same procedure was followed 
as in Section Three of Experiment I. A word from each of 30 
affectively-valenced word-pairs was selected by the 
subjects, allowing them to select the more descriptive 
adjectives (secondary predications) with which to frame 
their targeted persons. 
Section Four. The fourth section provided the 
incidental free recall for words that had been selected by 
the subjects as descriptive of their targeted persons. As 
in Experiment I, the subjects were given five minutes to 
complete this task before they were instructed to go on to 
Section Five of their packets. 
Section Five. The fifth section, again, provided a 
task to allow the subjects to record any other words they 
remembered from the word selection procedure in Section 
Three. The reader will recall that this was done in order 
to ensure that the subjects had an opportunity to record all 
of the words they might have remembered from the word list. 
Section Six. For the final part of the experiment, the 
subjects followed the same instructions as those that were 
given in the first experiment for shi~ting their predication 
by selecting a new person, except that for this experiment 
they were asked to think of their new person in the scene 
described earlier as they tried to remember descriptors that 
r 
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had relevance to the new predication. The subjects were 
given a debriefing statement to read at the completion of 
this task and, then, were free to leave the experiment (see 
Appendix D) . 
Results 
The effects of affectively framing a particular target 
person in the context of a social situation on the recall of 
affectively-valenced personality-trait words were examined. 
The dependent variables in this experiment were the number 
of words recalled in each of three affective categories: 
(1) positive words, (2) negative words, and (3) ambivalent 
words. The number of words recalled from the three 
affective wordtype categories was tabulated for each of the 
three recall tasks in the experiment, and the data were 
analyzed in a 2 X 4 X 3 factorial analysis of variance. The 
first variable was the between-subjects affective target 
variable with two conditions, "Liked" and "Disliked Target." 
The second between-subjects variable consisted of the four 
social setting conditions: (1) positive setting, (2) 
negative setting, (3) ambivalent setting, and (4) "no" 
setting. For the "no" setting condition, 34 subjects were 
randomly selected from the first experiment (half were in 
the "Liked" condition and half were in the "Disliked" 
condition), in which no social setting information was 
provided. The third variable in the analysis was within-
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subjects and consisted of the three affective categories of 
adjectives. 
As in the first experiment, misspellings of the 
experimental words were allowed provided that the words were 
recognizable. Intrusions (words that were not on the list 
and that should not have been recalled) were tabulated, but 
were excluded from the analyses. The mean number of 
intrusions calculated for each of the three recall tasks in 
the second experiment were as follows: first recall task M 
= 0.38 (SD= 0.73), second recall task M = 0.54 (SD= 0.74), 
and third recall task M = 0.66 (SD = 0.98). 
Hypothesis I stated that in the first two recall tasks 
in which the subjects were asked to remember descriptive 
adjectives, the recall for adjectives that were affectively 
consistent with the affective quality of the target would be 
greater when the affective quality of the setting was 
consistent than when it was inconsistent with the broader 
affective predication. This hypothesis would be supported 
by a three-way interaction between Liked/Disliked target, 
affective setting, and affective wordtype, and can be 
further tested for each of the two recall tasks with the 
simple effects comparisons of the mean number of positive 
words recalled in the "Liked Target" condition and of the 
mean number of negative words recalled in the "Disliked 
Target" condition for each type of affective setting. 
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The omnibus ~-test from the 2(Liked/Disliked target) X 
4(affective setting) X 3(affective wordtype) factorial 
analysis of variance for the first recall task (words 
descriptive of the target) did not reveal a significant 
three-way interaction, ~(6, 258) = 1.18, n.s., and simple 
effects tests were not performed. There was an unpredicted 
main effect for affective setting, ~(3,129) = 7.39, R < .05, 
with the means arraying as follows: positive setting M = 
1.92, negative setting M = 2.39, ambivalent setting M = 
1.77, and "no" setting M = 2.10. However, post-hoc 
comparisons of the affective setting means for the number 
words recalled collapsed across type of target and the three 
categories of affective wordtype revealed no significant 
differences. There was also a significant interaction 
between Liked/Disliked target and affective wordtype as in 
Experiment I, which will be discussed below as providing 
support for Hypothesis III. The means and standard 
deviations of the number of words recalled for this recall 
task are presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
EXPERIMENT II: 
RECALL TASK FOR WORDS DESCRIPTIVE OF THE TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF 
LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET, AFFECTIVE SETTING, AND 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
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EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITIONS Positive Negative Ambivalent 
LIKED 
TARGET: 
DISLIKED 
TARGET: 
Positive 
Setting 
Negative 
Setting 
Ambivalent 
Setting 
"No" 
Setting 
Positive 
Setting 
Negative 
Setting 
Ambivalent 
Setting 
"No" 
Setting 
Words 
2.56 
( 1. 63) 
3.22 
( 1. 00) 
2.38 
(0.96) 
3.00 
( 1. 54) 
1.42 
(1.22) 
1. 94 
( 1. 82) 
1.41 
( 1. 12) 
1.18 
(1.01) 
Words Words 
1. 25 2.19 
( 1. 13) ( 1. 56) 
1. 78 1. 72 
(1.40) (1.23) 
1. 31 1.94 
(1.20) ( 1. 06) 
1. 41 2.00 
( 1. 42) ( 1. 77) 
2.47 1. 63 
( 1. 07) (0.90) 
3.53 2.18 
(1.87) (1.38) 
2.12 1.47 
( 1. 27) ( 1. 28) 
2.88 2.12 
(1.36) (0.93) 
The omnibus r-test from the 2 X 4 X 3 factorial 
analysis of variance for the second recall task (words that 
were not descriptive of the target) also did not reveal a 
significant three-way interaction between Liked/Disliked 
target, affective setting and affective wordtype, r(6,258) = 
2.02, n.s., and, again, simple effects test were not 
performed. An unpredicted main effect for affective setting 
was also found for this recall task, r(3,129) = 4.65, 2 < 
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.05, with the means arraying as follows: positive setting M 
= 1.09, negative setting M = 1.43, ambivalent setting M = 
o.96, and "no" setting M = 1.31. However, post-hoc 
comparisons of the affective setting means of the number 
words recalled collapsed across type of target and the three 
categories of affective wordtype revealed no significant 
differences. Results also indicated a significant 
interaction between Liked/Disliked target and affective 
wordtype, as was observed in Experiment I. This will be 
discussed below under Hypothesis III. The means and 
standard deviations of the number of words recalled for this 
second recall task are presented in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
EXPERIMENT II: 
RECALL TASK FOR WORDS NOT DESCRIPTIVE OF THE TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF 
LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET, AFFECTIVE SETTING, AND 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
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EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITIONS Positive Negative Ambivalent 
LIKED 
TARGET: 
DISLIKED 
TARGET: 
Positive 
Setting 
Negative 
Setting 
Ambivalent 
Setting 
"No" 
Setting 
Positive 
Setting 
Negative 
Setting 
Ambivalent 
Setting 
"No" 
Setting 
Words 
0.75 
(0.86) 
1.28 
( 1. 53) 
0.75 
(0.77) 
1. 35 
( 1. 00) 
1. 68 
(1.63) 
2.06 
(1.30) 
1.12 
(0.93) 
2.12 
( 1. 69) 
Words Words 
1. 00 0.94 
( 1. 03) (0.93) 
1. 56 1. 50 
( 1. 15) (1.10) 
0.81 1. 00 
(0.98) (0.89) 
2.12 1. 06 
(1.36) (0.90) 
0.84 1. 32 
(0.83) (1.45) 
1. 29 0.88 
( 1. 53) ( 1. 32) 
1. 06 1. 00 
( 1. 09) ( 1. 32) 
0.47 0.76 
(0.72) (0.90) 
Hypothesis II predicted that, after the subjects have 
reversed their affective predication and have targeted a new 
person, the consistency between the affective assessment of 
the new person and the affective quality of the setting 
would facilitate the recall of more previously unrecalled 
adjectives compared to when the target and the setting are 
affectively inconsistent. This hypothesis can be tested 
with the simple main effects comparisons of the mean number 
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of negative words newly recalled after the shift to a 
disliked target in the "Liked Target" condition and of the 
mean number of positive words newly recalled after the shift 
to a liked target in the "Disliked Target" condition for 
each of the four types of affective social setting, if a 
significant three-way interaction is found between affective 
wordtype, Liked/Disliked target, and affective setting. 
The omnibus E-test from the 2 X 4 X 3 factorial 
analysis of variance did not reveal a significant three-way 
interaction between Liked/Disliked target, affective setting 
and affective wordtype, E(6,258) = 0.71, n.s., and simple 
effects tests were not performed. There was an unpredicted 
main ~ffect for Liked/Disliked target, E(l,129) = 5.62, R < 
.01, with the mean number of words newly recalled (collapsed 
across affective setting and affective wordtype) for the 
shift to a liked target in "Disliked Target condition (M = 
0.67) being significantly greater than the mean number of 
words newly recalled for the shift to a disliked target in 
the "Liked Target" condition (M = 0.44). 
There was also an unpredicted main effect for affective 
wordtype, E(2,258) = 24.94, R < .001. In order to 
investigate the means of the number of words recalled 
according to the three categories of affective wordtype 
collapsed across Liked/Disliked target and affective 
setting, Scheffe's test of comparing means was performed and 
revealed that positive words (M = 0.85) were recalled more 
73 
than negative words (M = 0.56), f(2,258) = 12.63, 2 < .01, 
that positive words (M = 0.85) were also recalled more than 
ambivalent words (M = 0.26), f(2,258) = 51.80, 2 < .001, and 
that negative words (M = 0.56) were recalled more than 
ambivalent words (M = 0.26), f(2,258) = 13.27, 2 < .01. The 
predicted target X affective wordtype interaction was 
observed and will be discussed below as provding support for 
Hypothesis III. The means and standard deviations of the 
number of words newly recalled after a shift in affective 
predication are presented in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6 
EXPERIMENT II: 
PREVIOUSLY UNRECALLED WORDS DESCRIPTIVE OF THE NEW TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
SHIFT IN LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET, AFFECTIVE SETTING, 
AND AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITIONS 
LIKED TO 
DISLIKED: 
DISLIKED 
TO LIKED: 
Positive 
Setting 
Negative 
Setting 
Ambivalent 
Setting 
"No" 
Setting 
Positive 
Setting 
Negative 
Setting 
Ambivalent 
Setting 
"No" 
Setting 
Positive 
Words 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
1.42 
(1. 30) 
1. 59 
( 1. 12) 
1.88 
(0.99) 
1. 59 
(1.37) 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
Negative Ambivalent 
Words Words 
1. 31 0.06 
( 1. 14) (0.25) 
0.83 0.33 
(0.92) (0.77) 
0.69 o.oo 
(0.70) (0.00) 
1. 35 0.47 
(1.11) (0.72) 
0.00 0.26 
(0.00) (0.56) 
0.06 0.29 
(0.24) (0.59) 
0.18 0.24 
(0.39) (0.56) 
0.18 0.41 
(0.39) (0.51) 
Hypothesis III stated that the overall pattern of 
recall across the three recall tasks for this second 
experiment would cross-validate the hypotheses set forth in 
Experiment I. As in the first experiment, Liked/Disliked 
target X affective wordtype interactions were obtained, and 
simple effects comparisons of the mean number of words 
recalled according to affective wordtype for the "Liked" and 
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"Disliked Target" conditions were performed for each of the 
three recall tasks in this experiment. 
For the incidental recall task for words selected as 
descriptive of the target (first recall task), the 2 X 4 X 3 
factorial analysis of variance revealed a significant 
interaction for affective wordtype by Liked/Disliked target 
condition, K(2,258) = 44.76, R < .0001. The simple effects 
test of affective wordtype for the "Liked Target" condition 
was significant, K(2,258) = 24.13, R < .001, with the recall 
data arraying as follows: positive words M = 2.81 (SD= 
1.33), negative words M = 1.45 (SD= 1.28), and ambivalent 
words M = 1.96 (SD= 1.41) (refer to Table 7). Scheffe's 
test for comparing means was performed to evaluate the 
differences between the affective wordtype means for this 
condition. These comparisons revealed that positive words 
(M = 2.81) were recalled more often than negative words CM= 
1.45), K(2,258) = 47.24, R < .001, that positive words (M = 
2.81) were also recalled more frequently than ambivalent 
words (M = 1.96), K(2,258) = 18.54, R < .001, and that 
negative words (M = 1.45) were recalled more often than 
ambivalent words (M = 1.96), K(2,258) = 6.60, R < .05. 
TABLE 7 
EXPERIMENT II: 
RECALL TASK FOR WORDS DESCRIPTIVE OF THE TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF 
LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET AND AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
(COLLAPSED ACROSS AFFECTIVE SETTING) 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITION Positive Negative Ambivalent 
Words Words Words 
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Liked Target 2.81 (1.33) 1.45 (1.28) 1.96 (1.41) 
Disliked Target 1.49 (1.33) 2.74 (1.48) 1.84 (1.15) 
The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Disliked Target condition on the first recall task was 
significant, E(2,258) = 22.46, 2 < .001, with the recall 
data arraying as follows: positive words M = 1.49 (SD= 
1.33), negative words M = 2.74 (SD= 1.48), and ambivalent 
words M = 1.84 (SD= 1.15) (refer to Table 7). Scheffe's 
tests for comparing means.revealed that negative words (M = 
2.74) were recalled more often than both positive words (M = 
1.49), E(2,258) = 42.29, R < .001, as well as ambivalent 
words (M = 1.84), E(2,258) = 21.67, 2 < .001, and that there 
was no significant difference in recall between positive 
words and ambivalent words, E(2,258) = 3.41, n.s .. 
For the recall tasks of words that were not selected as 
descriptive of the target (second recall task), the 2 X 4 X 
3 factorial analysis of variance revealed a significant 
interaction for affective wordtype X Liked/Disliked target 
condition, E(2,258) = 10.24, R < .001. The simple effects 
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test of affective wordtype for the "Liked Target" condition 
was not significant, E(2,258) = 1.75, n.s., indicating no 
differences in the number of words recalled across affective 
wordtype for this condition. These data are presented in 
Table 8. 
TABLE 8 
EXPERIMENT II: 
RECALL TASK FOR WORDS NOT DESCRIPTIVE OF THE TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF 
LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET AND AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
(COLLAPSED ACROSS AFFECTIVE SETTING) 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITION 
Liked Target 
Disliked Target 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
Positive 
Words 
1.04 (1.11) 
1.74 (1.45) 
Negative 
Words 
1.39 (1.23) 
0.91 (1.10) 
Ambivalent 
Words 
1.13 (0.98) 
1.00 (1.26) 
The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Disliked Target" condition on the second recall task was 
significant, E(2,258) = 11.99, R < .001, with the recall 
data arraying as follows: positive words M = 1.74 (SD= 
1.45), negative words M = 0.91 (SD= 1.10), and ambivalent 
words M = 1.00 (SD= 1.26) (refer to Table 8). Scheffe's 
test for comparing means revealed that positive words (M = 
1.74) were recalled more than both negative words (M = 
0.91), E(2,258) = 19.82, R < .001, as well as ambivalent 
words (M = 1.00), E(2,258) = 15.93, R < .001, and that there 
was no significant difference in recall between negative 
words and ambivalent words, E(2,258) = 0.21, n.s .. 
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The 2 X 4 X 3 factorial analysis of variance 
investigating the previously unrecalled words descriptive of 
a new person targeted by a shift in affective predication to 
the opposite (third recall task) revealed a significant 
interaction for affective wordtype by Liked/Disliked target 
condition, E(2,258) = 117.19, R < .0001. The simple effects 
test of affective wordtype for the ''Liked Target" condition 
(after a shift to a disliked target) was significant, 
E(2,258) = 40.37, R < .0001, with the recall data arraying 
as follows: positive words M = 0.06 (SD= 0.24), negative 
words M = 1.04 (SD= 1.01), and ambivalent words M = 0.22 
(SD= 0.57). These data are presented in Table 9. 
Scheffe's tests for comparing means revealed that more 
negative words (M = 1.04) were newly recalled than both 
positive words (M = 0.06), E(2,258) = 70.32, R < .0001, as 
well as ambivalent words (M = 0.22), E(2,258) = 48.43, R < 
.0001, and that there was no significant difference in 
recall between previously unrecalled positive words (M = 
0.06) and ambivalent words (M = 0.22), E(2,258) = 1.95, 
n.s.). 
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TABLE 9 
EXPERIMENT II: 
PREVIOUSLY UNRECALLED WORDS DESCRIPTIVE OF THE NEW TARGET, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
SHIFT IN LIKED/DISLIKED TARGET AND AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
(COLLAPSED ACROSS AFFECTIVE SETTING) 
AFFECTIVE WORDTYPE 
SHIFT IN TARGET 
CONDITIONS Positive Negative Ambivalent 
Words Words Words 
Liked to Disliked 0.06 (0.24) 1. 04 ( 1. 01) 0.22 (0.57) 
Disliked to Liked 1. 61 (1.20) 0.10 (0.30) 0.30 (0.55) 
The simple effects test of affective wordtype for the 
"Disliked Target" condition (after a shift to a liked 
target) was also significant, f(2,258) = 102.48, R < .0001, 
with the recall data arraying as follows: positive words M 
= 1.61 (SD= 1.20), negative words M = 0.10 (SD= 0.30), and 
ambivalent words M = 0.30 (SD= 0.55) (refer to Table 9). 
Scheffe's tests for comparing means revealed that more new 
positive words (M = 1.61) were recalled compared to new 
negative words (M = 0.10), f(2,258) = 173.62, R < .0001, and 
compared to new ambivalent words (M = 0.30), f(2,258) = 
130.78, R < .0001, and that no significant difference was 
found when comparing the recall between new negative words 
and new ambivalent words, f(2,258) = 3.03, n.s .. These 
findings replicate the results of the first experiment, as 
predicted in Hypothesis III. 
The findings related to the third recall task can again 
be considered in terms of the percentage of subjects in the 
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second experiment who retrieved adjectives that they had not 
previously recalled. When the new target was liked, 86% of 
the subjects recalled between one and five additional 
positive adjectives (Mode= 2). Nine percent of the 
subjects recalled one or two negative adjectives when the 
new target was liked (Mode= 1), and 26% of the sample 
recalled one or two ambivalent adjectives (Mode = 1) . When 
the shift in affective predication was to disliked, 64% of 
the subjects recalled between one and four additional 
negative adjectives (Mode = 1). Six percent of the subjects 
recalled a single positive adjective when the the new target 
was disliked, and 15% of the subjects recalled either one to 
three additional ambivalent adjectives which could predicate 
the new target (Mode= 1). 
In order to illustrate Hypothesis III more clearly and 
show the significant cross-validation between Experments I 
and II, the two experiments are compared graphically. 
Figure 2 depicts the comparison for the first recall task in 
which subjects were asked to recall words that were 
descriptive of their target. In order to make the graph 
more readable, the results have been collapsed across the 
"Liked" and "Disliked Target" conditions (and across the 
affective setting conditions for Experiment II). For the 
graph in Figure 2, "consistent words" represent the number 
of words recalled that were affectively consistent with the 
broader affective predication. In other words, positive 
words would be consistent with the "liked" predication and 
negative words would be consistent with the "disliked" 
predication. "Inconsistent words" represent the number of 
words recalled that were affectively inconsistent with the 
primary predication (i.e., negative words for the "liked" 
predication and positive words for the "disliked" 
predication). "Ambivalent words" represent the number or 
words recalled that had been previously rated as not 
consistently positive or negative in meaning. 
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The reader is referred to Figure 3 for the comparison 
between the two experiments on the second recall task in 
which subjects were asked to recall words that were not 
descriptive of their target. "Consistent," ''inconsistent," 
and "ambivalent" words are represented on this graph in they 
same manner as they were on Figure 2. 
2.5 
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1.5 
1 
0.5 
0 
.. CONSISTENT WORDS al INCONSISTENT WORDS 
CJ AMBIVALENT WORDS 
EXPERIMENT I EXPERIMENT II 
Fig. 2. Mean Recall for Words Descriptive of the 
Target for Experiment I and II 
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EXPERIMENT I EXPERIMENT II 
Fig. 3. Mean Recall for Words Not Descriptive of the 
Target for Experiment I and II 
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Figure 4 depicts the comparison of the third recall 
task in which subjects were asked to shift their affective 
predication and target a new person. The graph portrays the 
number of words recalled that had been previously 
unremembered on the first two recall tasks. On this graph, 
"consistent words" represent negative words for the shift 
from a liked target to a disliked target and positive words 
for the shift from a disliked target to a liked target. 
"Inconsistent words" reflect the opposite pattern, and 
"ambivalent words," again, reflect those words which had 
been previously rated as not consistently positive or 
negative in meaning. 
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0.8 
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0.2 
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Fig. 4. Mean Recall for Previously Unrecalled Words 
Descriptive of the New Target (after a Shift 
in Affective Predication) 
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Conclusion 
Neither Hypothesis I nor Hypothesis II were confirmed. 
Contrary to our predictions, the addition of an affectively-
valenced social situation did not significantly enhance or 
diminish the recall of affectively-valenced words in terms 
of the relationship of the affective quality of the setting 
to the broader affective predication. 
The only significant difference between the "Liked" and 
"Disliked Target" conditions for this entire study was found 
in the third part of this experiment. It seems that, in 
this case, the shift from a disliked to a liked target 
favored the overall recall of previously unremembered 
adjectives compared to the shift from a liked to a disliked 
target. 
Hypothesis III was confirmed. The pattern of recall 
for Experiment II cross-validated the findings of Experiment 
I. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The results of both experiments offer support for the 
role of affective predication in memory retrieval. In the 
first experiment, as we predicted, the affective meaning 
quality of the "primary predication" extending to a target 
person facilitated the recall of adjectives ("secondary 
predications") that were affectively consistent with the 
primary predication compared to the recall of adjectives 
that were not consistent. Those subjects who thought of a 
person whom they liked recalled more positive than negative 
adjectives. Whereas subjects who thought of a person whom 
they disliked recalled more negative than positive words. 
For the second recall task in which we asked subjects 
to remember other words from the selection task, we had also 
assumed that the originally considered affective predication 
(i.e., either liked or disliked) would continue to act as 
the "primary predication" under which subjects would be 
trying to retrieve other adjectival words. Therefore, we 
had predicted that subjects in the "Liked Person" condition 
would remember more positive words that were not selected as 
descriptive of their target than negative words, and vice 
versa for the "Disliked Person" condition. However, there 
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was a significant trend toward the reverse finding 
occurring. Subjects in the "Disliked Target" condition 
actually remembered more positive than negative words. The 
recall of words for the "Liked Target" condition was the 
opposite of this pattern, although the differences were not 
significant. 
When looking at the instructions for the second recall 
task, we had asked the subjects to write down any other 
words they remembered from the selection task, and we 
clarified this by saying "any words not descriptive of the 
person" they had selected. In considering these 
instructions, it seems that we may have been implicitly 
asking the subjects to go "outside the circle" of their 
original affective predication. Since LLT contends that 
oppositionality is implicitly tied to predication, it seems 
that when trying to think of other words from the adjective 
selection task that were not descriptive of the target, the 
subjects may have had a tendency to "move to the opposite" 
on their own. 
The fact that subjects may have already shifted to the 
opposite affective predication and that they recalled a 
significant number of words that were opposite in affective 
meaning to the original affective predication actually 
serves to make our findings for the third recall task more 
interesting. When we explicitly requested that subjects 
shift their affective predication to the opposite (i.e., 
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from liked to disliked or vice versa) and had them target a 
specific, new person, they were able to recall previously 
unremembered adjectives targeting the new person that were 
consistent with the shift in affective predication. 
By providing the first two recall tasks, we thought 
that we had given the subjects the opportunity to exhaust 
their memory for words from the experimental selection task. 
However, the new context provided by the change in the 
affective quality of the realm of meaning being considered 
by the subjects allowed them to reconceptualize the 
situation. By affirming this new organization, the subjects 
were able to target new adjectives that were relevant to the 
new affective context and, in turn, these adjectives served 
as secondary predications of the newly targeted person. 
Thus, this demonstration of the role that affective 
assessment plays in memory "retrieval" epitomizes the 
precedent-sequacious process of predication. 
The one unpredicted finding from experiment I which 
revealed that more positive and negative words were recalled 
compared to ambivalent words in the third recall task for 
previously unremembered words (after a shift in affective 
predication) is not unexpected considering the results. 
Since we had predicted that most of the newly remembered 
words would be affectively consistent with the shift in 
affective predication, and since this finding for affective 
wordtype is collapsed across the Liked/Disliked conditions, 
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it seems fairly obvious that the recall for positive and 
negative words that have a direct meaningful alignment with 
one of the broader realms of affection would be greater than 
for the ambivalent words, which do not necessarily relate 
directly to the affective predication of either experimental 
condition. 
In the second experiment, we did not find that the 
addition of an affectively-valenced social situation 
influenced the pattern of recall for the affectively-
valenced adjectives in the manner we had predicted. In 
fact, it seems that our affective settings, overall, were 
not meaningful enough to have a significant effect over and 
above the meaningful context provided by the direct 
predicational organization between affection and the 
targeted liked or disliked person. 
Our results did indicate that the negative social 
situation did seem to enhance the overall recall of all of 
the affective adjectives compared to the recall for the 
positive and ambivalent social situations, although these 
differences did not prove to be significant with follow-up 
analyses. This slight benefit in recall for the negative 
setting may indicate that this scene provided a more 
meaningful context for the subjects in which to ground their 
memories than the other scenes. The research in mood 
intensity has shown evidence that affectively intense events 
or thoughts enhance recall (Singer & Salovey, 1988), so this 
may have played a role in the pattern of results for the 
negative setting compared to the other settings. 
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In hypothesizing why our affective social settings did 
not influence recall, one possibility is that we did not 
utilize the introspective perspective of LLT in creating the 
setting manipulation. A possibility for future research 
might be to have subjects phenomenally frame their own 
social situations. We might have a subject think of a 
situation he or she considers very negative, encourage him 
or her to really visualize it, and then indicate to us when 
he or she is truly "in" the situation. This manipulation, 
using "personal predication," could then be compared to a 
condition utilizing experimentally-prepared settings (as in 
the current study), that had been more rigorously pretested 
for affective valence and intensity for the population being 
tested. 
Despite the lack of significant findings for our 
affective social situation, our second experiment did 
provide an excellent replication of the findings from our 
first experiment. In fact, the pattern of recall for the 
second experiment was virtually identical to the first 
experiment with the exception that we had a difference in 
recall between the shift from a disliked to a liked person 
compared to the shift from a liked to a disliked person in 
the second experiment. This difference in recall for 
Liked/Disliked Target after the shift in affective 
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predication actually mirrors the findings of earlier LLT 
research showing that when subjects move from a task in 
which they have to remember disliked items to one in which 
they have to remember liked materials, the number of items 
recalled is greater compared to when the subjects move from 
liked to disliked materials (Rychlak & Tobin, 1971). 
Other directions for future study that might serve to 
solidify as well as expand on our findings dealing with the 
role of affective predication in memory retrieval might 
include an experiment that is very similar to Experiment I 
in this study, in which we have half the subjects target a 
"new person" in the third recall task while maintaining the 
same affective predication as in the first two recall tasks 
and have the other half of the subjects target a "new 
person" after a shift in affective predication (as in the 
current study). In a study like this, we could then 
investigate whether it was actually the shift in 
"predication" or the "new target" that facilitated the 
recall of new words. This would provide a more direct test 
of the "predicational effect" within in the context of this 
type of experimental design investigating affective 
predication. 
Another area that would provide fertile ground for 
further inquiry would be to expand upon the research based 
on Anderson and Pichert's (1978) study investigating the 
recall of new items about a home following shift from the 
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perspective of a homebuyer to a burglar, or vice versa. To 
do a study such as this within the framework of Logical 
Learning Theory would serve the function of exploring 
whether a shift in other types of semantic predication will 
enhance "retrieval" in the same fashion as a shift in 
affective predication did. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Instructions to Subjects 
Section One 
Each of you has been given a packet with six sections. 
Please do not move on to a new page until instructed to do 
so. 
We are studying the personality traits of certain types of 
people. Please read the instructions on the first page of 
your packet and follow them accordingly. 
(When the subjects are finished writing down the initials of 
the person they like or dislike) Now, turn to Section Two of 
your packet. 
[Experiment II: Before we turn to Section Two of your 
packet, please sit back and relax for a moment. Close your 
eyes and try to visualize yourself in the scene that I am 
going to describe to you. Please concentrate carefully. 
(Experimenter reads the setting description) Please focus 
on the scene for a few seconds. (after 10 seconds) Now turn 
to Section Two of your packet.] 
Section Two 
This section will provide an example of the task you will be 
instructed to carry out in Section Three. Take the 3x5 inch 
card you have been give and place it vertically under the 
first pair of personality-trait words on this list, the 
words, efficient and good-tempered. Do not move on the next 
word-pair until you are instructed to do so. 
Concentrating on the person you selected on the first page 
[Experiment II: as if they were sitting next to you in the 
scene described], decide which of the two words best 
describes this person and place a check mark next to this 
word. You may feel that both words are characteristic of 
your person or that neither word is very characteristic, but 
please check the word that is the more applicable of the 
two. Again, please do not move on to the next pair of words 
until I instruct you to do so. Also, please think very 
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carefully about the person you chose as you are carrying out 
this task. 
(The experimenter will read each word-pair aloud. The 
subjects will be given 10 seconds to concentrate on each 
word-pair and to decide which word is more characteristic of 
the person they have indicated on page one. All subjects 
will go through the words together.) 
(After going through the three word-pairs) Good. Now, the 
next section contains 30 pairs of personality 
characteristics just like the words listed on this page. 
The words are listed on three separate pages. We will go 
through this list just as we did for the word-pairs in this 
section. Use your index card to keep your place on the 
sheet. For these words, again, check the word in each pair 
you feel is most characteristic of the person whose 
initials you wrote on the first page. As you make your 
decisions, please think carefully about your person, and do 
not move on to the next word-pair until you are instructed 
to do so. 
Any questions? Now, turn to the next section. 
Section Three 
Place your index card vertically under the first word-pair 
in the column. (The experimenter will read off a word-pair 
every 10 seconds according to the particular random order of 
the list used for the group being tested. The subjects will 
be instructed to turn the page for the next column of words 
when appropriate.) 
(As soon as the 10 seconds has passed for the last word-
pair) Please turn to next section. 
Section Four 
Please make sure that the previous pages of your packet are 
folded over so that they are completely out of view. 
On this page, taking you time, please record as many of the 
words that checked on the previous pages in Section Three as 
possible. Write down only those words which you judged to 
be most characteristic of the person on the first page. 
Please do not look back to see which words you checked. You 
will have about five minutes for this task. This will be 
plenty of time, so please take you time and think carefully 
about the person you selected as you are trying to remember 
the words. If you finish before time is called, please wait 
quietly and do not turn the page until you instructed to do 
so. 
(After 5 minutes have passed) Does anyone need any more 
time? Please turn to Section Five of your packet. 
Section Five 
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On this page, please record any other words you remember 
from Section Three (any words which you did not check as 
descriptive of the person). You will also have five minutes 
for this task, so please take you time and wait quietly if 
you finish early. 
(After 5 minutes have passed) Does anyone need any more 
time? Please turn to Section Six of your packet. 
Section Six 
Please read the instruction at the top of the page in 
Section six and follow them accordingly. You will also have 
five minutes to complete this task. 
(After 5 minutes have passed) Does anyone need any more 
time? As I come around and collect your packets, I will be 
handing out a debriefing statement. After you have finished 
reading this, turn it in, and you will be free to go. If 
anyone has any questions, I will be happy to answer them. 
APPENDIX B 
Sample Experimental Packet 
SECTION ONE 
Please do not put your name anywhere on this packet, so that 
we may assure your anonymity and confidentiality in this 
study. 
Male Female 
Age 
We are studying the personality characteristics of people we 
(like/dislike). Please think of a person whom you 
(like/dislike) very much. Write this person's initials on 
the line below. 
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SECTION TWO 
You will be presented with pairs of personality-trait words. 
Please put your index card under the first pair of words. 
Concentrating on the person you selected on the first page, 
decide which of the two words best describes this person and 
place a check mark next to this word. You may feel that 
both words are characteristic of your person or that neither 
word is very characteristic, but please check the word that 
is the more applicable of the two. Please do not move on to 
the next pair of words until you are instructed to do so by 
the experimenter. Also, please think carefully about the 
person you chose as you are carrying out this task. 
1. efficient 
good-tempered 
2. prideful 
theatrical 
3. spiteful 
annoying 
(Please do not turn the page until instructed to do so.) 
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SECTION THREE 
Now, put your card under the first word-pair in the column. 
Do not move on to another word-pair or the next page until 
you are instructed to do so. As you look at these words, 
mark as you did before the word in the pair which is more 
descriptive of the person whose initials you wrote on the 
first page. There will be thirty word-pairs in all on the 
next three pages. Please concentrate on this person you 
selected as you carry out this task. 
1. pessimistic 
careless 
2. enthusiastic 
honest 
3. considerate 
sincere 
4. grouchy 
unsympathetic 
5. cautious 
shrewd 
6. meticulous 
emotional 
7. lazy 
ill-mannered 
8. wise 
courteous 
9. conservative 
mathematical 
10. boring 
incompetent 
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11. radical 
modest 
12. pushy 
philosophical 
13. hostile 
unethical 
14. cheerful 
honorable 
15. cold 
foolish 
16. skillful 
interesting 
17. changeable 
blunt 
18. understanding 
productive 
19. optimistic 
friendly 
20. uncongenial 
thoughtless 
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21. crafty 
tough 
22. phony 
deceitful 
23. warm 
generous 
24. cruel 
lifeless 
25. scientific 
informal 
26. headstrong 
normal 
27. nonchalant 
perf ectionistic 
28. depressed 
selfish 
29. amiable 
responsible 
30. happy 
kind-hearted 
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SECTION FOUR 
On this page, taking you time, please record as many of the 
words that you checked on the previous pages (Section Three) 
as possible. Write down only those words which you judged 
to be most characteristic of the person on the first page. 
Please do not look back to see which words you checked. You 
will have about five minutes for this task. This will be 
plenty of time, so please take you time and think carefully 
about the person you selected as you try to remember the 
words. If you finish before time is called, please wait 
quietly and do not turn the page until instructed to do so. 
When you have written down all the checked words which you 
are able to remember, please wait for the experimenter to 
tell you to turn to Section Five. 
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SECTION FIVE 
On this page, please record any other words you remember 
from Section Three (any words which did not check as 
descriptive of the person). You will also have five minutes 
for this task, so please take your time and wait quietly if 
you finish early. 
When you have written down all of the unchecked words that 
you are able to remember, please wait for the experimenter 
to direct you to turn the page to the sixth and final 
section. 
SECTION SIX 
Now, I would like you to "change persons." Think of a 
person whom you (dislike/like) very much rather than 
(like/dislike). Please focus on this person for a few 
moments and write their initials below. 
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Concentrating on this new person carefully, try to think of 
any words from Section Three you can remember that describe 
the person and write them below. Again, you will have at 
least five minutes to complete this task, so take your time 
and do not look back at the other pages of the packet. 
When you have recorded all of the words you are able to 
remember and the 5-minute time limit is up, please turn in 
your packet to the experimenter. 
i! I 
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APPENDIX C 
Experimental Adjectives 
(taken from the Anderson (1968) Norms) 
The adjectival words used in the experiment are listed 
here according their affective valence. The words were 
rated by five independent raters on a 7-point scale and are 
listed with their mean ratings. The following scale was 
used by the independent judges to make their ratings: 
II 11 = Positive 
II 2 = Somewhat positive 
II 3 = Slightly positive 
II 4 = Could be either positive or negative 
II 5 = Slightly negative 
II 6 = Somewhat negative 
II 7 = Negative 
Positive Words Mean Rating 
1. honest 1. 0 
2. cheerful 1.2 
3. happy 1. 0 
4. considerate 1.2 
5. sincere 1. 0 
6. enthusiastic 1. 2 
7. understanding 1. 0 
8. amiable 1. 2 
9. friendly 1.2 
10. productive 1.4 
11. kind-hearted 1. 6 
12. courteous 1. 6 
13. honorable 1. 2 
14. skillful 1. 2 
15. warm 1.4 
16. interesting 1. 2 
17. responsible 1. 2 
18. optimistic 1. 2 
19. wise 1. 0 
20. generous 1. 4 
(Total Mean Rating - 1. 2) 
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Negative Words Mean Rating 
1. deceitful 6.8 
2 . grouchy 7.0 
3. depressed 6.6 
4. thoughtless 6.8 
5. phony 6.8 
6. lifeless 6.4 
7. unsympathetic 6.4 
8. uncongenial 6.4 
9. hostile 6.8 
10. lazy 6.6 
11. cruel 7.0 
12. ill-mannered 6.6 
13. unethical 7.0 
14. incompetent 6.8 
15. cold 6.4 
16. boring 6.2 
17. careless 6.4 
18. pessimistic 6.4 
19. foolish 6.0 
20. selfish 6.6 
(Total Mean Rating - 6.6) 
Ambivalent Words Mean Rating 
1. emotional 3.6 
2. informal 3.6 
3. normal 3.4 
4. cautious 3.6 
5. nonchalant 4.0 
6. mathematical 3.6 
7. changeable 3.6 
8. radical 4.0 
9. tough 4.0 
10. crafty 3.8 
11. conservative 3.8 
12. perf ectionistic 3.8 
13. meticulous 4.2 
14. headstrong 5.2 
15. modest 3.4 
16. blunt 3.8 
17. philosophical 3.0 
18. scientific 3.2 
19. pushy 4.8 
20. shrewd 3.2 
(Total Mean Rating - 3.8) 
APPENDIX D 
Debriefing Statement 
INVESTIGATOR: Donna G. Hughes 
FACULTY SPONSOR: Joseph F. Rychlak, Ph.D. 
The purpose of this study is to give support for a 
predicational view of cognition. Unlike the mediational 
view of cognition, in which our thinking is shaped by 
associations formed by inputs based entirely on the 
frequency and contiguity of past experiences, the 
predication view of cognition depicts thinking with "the 
thinker" taking a position on something through the logical 
process of framing broader patterns of meaning in relation 
to narrower patterns of meaning. That is to say, our 
thinking is framed by the particular patterns of meaning we 
affirm or deny. 
In the present study, we had the subjects predicate in 
a certain way by having them select a person they like or 
dislike. This created the predicational context for the 
subject. The subjects were then asked to check words, which 
were controlled for in terms of frequency and normed for 
likability, if they described the person they selected. 
These words were also rated independently to be either 
positive or negative in nature. 
Based on the predicational model of cognition, the 
subject predicating on a "liked" person will select more 
positive than negative words to describe their person, 
remember more positive selected words, and remember more 
positive unselected words. For the subject predication on a 
"disliked" person, the opposite should be the case. 
This research is based on the theory of Dr. Joseph 
Rychlak of our Department of Psychology. The book in which 
this kind of theory is presented is listed below, but if you 
would like to discuss any of this with him, he would be 
happy to arrange an appointment with you. 
Rychlak, J.F. (1988). The psychology of riqorous humanism 
(2nd ed.). New York: New York University Press. 
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APPENDIX E 
Experiment II: Social Situations 
Positive Social Situation 
Award Dinner. Imagine you are being given an award for 
something you really value. You have made some truly great 
achievements. Your time and effort have really paid off, 
and you are being honored by your peers. Your are filled 
with personal pride and a sense of well-being. The award 
banquet is a beautiful occasion and all you friends and 
family are with you to help you celebrate. You can't 
remember the last time you had so many of the people you 
cared about together, and all having such a lovely time. 
The conversation is flowing, the food is delicious, and 
everyone is enjoying themselves, including you. When it 
comes to the time to accept your award, you do so with poise 
and grace giving a few words of acceptance. You have never 
had such a feeling success. Full of pride, you walk back to 
the table to rejoin the jovial group. As you sit back down 
at the table with your friends, you are showered with 
congratulations by them. Looking around, you see the person 
whose initials you have written sit down next to your place 
at the table. 
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Negative Social Situation 
Hospital Waiting Room. Imagine you are in a hospital 
waiting room. Someone you care about deeply is very ill. 
You are extremely worried and concerned about you loved one. 
You have been waiting there for hours today and also spent 
all of yesterday at the hospital. You are unable to visit 
your loved one very much as doctors and nurses are often in 
the room. Very few of your friends or family members have 
come to visit and most do not stay very long. You are 
emotionally and physically exhausted and you have not felt 
like eating. The many cups of coffee that you have been 
drinking are making you feel even more edgy and nervous. 
You get up and go to the hospital room. Unfortunately, when 
you walk in you see you loved one is asleep, so you decide 
you had better not stay. As you grudgingly walk back to the 
waiting room, you beginning to feel like you cannot wait 
anymore. Consumed with worry and personal fatigue, you 
slump down in a chair. Glancing up, you see the person 
whose initials you have written come in the room and sit 
down next to you. 
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Ambivalent Social Situation 
Classroom. Imagine you in a classroom waiting for 
class to begin. It is a warm day, but it is about to rain. 
Contemplating the course, you realize it is a difficult one, 
but you are really enjoying the subject matter. The 
professor has a way of making the topics of discussion come 
alive, so that learning is interesting, even though he is 
demanding of his students, requiring a lot of time and 
effort on their part. Although the professor can be 
intimidating in the classroom, he is very easy to get along 
with one-on-one. As you wait for class to start, you think 
about how you have had a good day so far, but it has been 
long and tiring. Even though you are tired, you are ready 
for class to start because today's topic is of particular 
interest to you. The class is going to begin with a quiz, 
but you have studied hard and are well-prepared for it. The 
professor comes in and announces that there will be a quiz 
as scheduled, but that there will be an interesting film 
presented afterwards. Looking around as the professor is 
passing out papers, you see the person whose initials you 
have written come in and sit down next to you. 
APPENDIX F 
Experiment I: Raw Data 
Key 
L/D Target = Liked/Disliked Target Condition 
1st recall task = recall task for words descriptive of the 
target 
2nd recall task = recall task for words not descriptive of 
the target 
3rd recall task = recall of previously unrecalled words 
after a shift in affective predication 
Pos = number of positive adjectival words recalled 
Neg = number of negative adjectival words recalled 
Amb = number of ambivalent adjectival words recalled 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
01 M 20 LIKED 5 3 0 2 3 1 0 2 1 
02 F 20 LIKED 1 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 
03 M 19 LIKED 2 3 2 0 0 3 0 2 0 
04 F 18 LIKED 2 0 5 0 5 1 0 1 1 
05 F 20 LIKED 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
06 F 18 LIKED 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 
07 F 19 LIKED 4 2 2 3 3 2 0 3 2 
08 F 18 LIKED 4 2 4 1 3 2 0 2 1 
09 M 24 LIKED 1 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 
10 F 17 LIKED 3 4 3 3 0 2 0 3 0 
11 F 19 LIKED 5 4 5 3 3 2 0 1 0 
12 M 18 LIKED 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
13 M 21 LIKED 3 3 6 1 2 0 0 2 0 
14 F 20 LIKED 2 0 2 1 4 0 0 3 0 
15 M 20 LIKED 4 1 5 0 1 1 0 3 0 
16 F 24 LIKED 4 2 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 
17 F 21 LIKED 2 3 1 1 5 2 0 1 1 
18 F 18 LIKED 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 
19 M 21 LIKED 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
20 M 19 LIKED 6 5 2 3 2 1 0 1 0 
21 M 18 LIKED 6 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 
22 M 18 LIKED 2 2 1 3 1 1 0 2 0 
23 M 22 LIKED 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
116 
117 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
24 M 18 LIKED 3 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 
25 F 19 LIKED 6 0 1 2 3 0 0 2 0 
26 F LIKED 2 1 2 3 1 1 0 2 0 
27 M 20 LIKED 3 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 
28 F 19 LIKED 4 3 5 1 2 3 0 1 1 
29 M 22 LIKED 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
30 F 18 LIKED 5 1 3 1 3 2 0 5 0 
31 F 18 LIKED 2 0 2 1 3 1 0 2 0 
32 M 18 DISLIKED 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
33 F 18 DISLIKED 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 0 0 
34 F 19 DISLIKED 2 5 2 1 2 1 2 0 0 
35 M 18 DISLIKED 3 0 0 1 1 2 3 0 1 
36 M 20 DISLIKED 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
37 M 21 DISLIKED 2 4 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 
38 F 19 DISLIKED 2 2 1 4 2 1 2 0 1 
39 F 19 DISLIKED 3 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 
40 F 18 DISLIKED 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
41 M 20 DISLIKED 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 
42 F 19 DISLIKED 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 
43 F 18 DISLIKED 1 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 
44 F DISLIKED 0 3 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
45 F 19 DISLIKED 0 6 2 3 0 1 6 0 0 
46 F 19 DISLIKED 0 4 3 3 1 1 1 0 0 
47 F 18 DISLIKED 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
48 F 20 DISLIKED 0 1 4 2 2 0 1 0 0 
49 F 18 DISLIKED 0 4 4 6 0 3 1 0 0 
50 F 20 DISLIKED 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 
51 M 19 DISLIKED 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 1 
52 F 18 DISLIKED 2 1 0 0 2 3 0 1 0 
53 F 19 DISLIKED 1 4 4 1 0 2 2 0 0 
54 F 19 DISLIKED 3 4 4 5 0 0 1 1 1 
55 M 20 DISLIKED 3 3 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 
56 M 19 DISLIKED 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 
57 F 19 DISLIKED 2 3 2 3 0 0 2 0 0 
58 M 18 DISLIKED 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 
59 M 19 DISLIKED 1 3 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
60 M 19 DISLIKED 0 6 4 1 0 4 1 0 0 
61 F 21 DISLIKED 0 3 3 3 1 0 2 0 1 
62 F 18 DISLIKED 0 3 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 
63 F 19 DISLIKED 1 2 2 3 1 0 2 0 0 
64 M 18 DISLIKED 0 2 5 2 3 2 2 0 0 
APPENDIX G 
Experiment II: Raw Data 
Key 
L/D Target = Liked/Disliked Target Condition 
1st recall task = recall task for words descriptive of the 
target 
2nd recall task = recall task for words not descriptive of 
the target 
3rd recall task = recall of previously unrecalled words 
after a shift in affective predication 
Pos = number of positive adjectival words recalled 
Neg = number of negative adjectival words recalled 
Amb = number of ambivalent adjectival words recalled 
POSITIVE SETTING 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
023 F 17 LIKED 6 0 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 
025 F 19 LIKED 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
026 F 19 LIKED 3 1 3 2 2 1 0 2 0 
029 F 19 LIKED 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
032 F 19 LIKED 3 2 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 
059 F 18 LIKED 4 3 2 2 0 1 0 3 0 
061 F 18 LIKED 3 0 4 0 0 3 0 1 1 
063 F 17 LIKED 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 
064 F 18 LIKED 1 1 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 
067 F 18 LIKED 2 0 3 1 2 1 0 2 0 
068 F 21 LIKED 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 
093 F 18 LIKED 5 3 4 1 2 3 0 2 0 
096 F 18 LIKED 4 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
097 M 17 LIKED 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
100 M 20 LIKED 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 4 0 
103 F 18 LIKED 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
022 F 18 DISLIKED 2 2 2 0 2 2 3 0 0 
024 F 18 DISLIKED 2 4 1 4 2 2 3 0 1 
027 F 18 DISLIKED 0 3 2 1 1 2 5 0 0 
028 F 18 DISLIKED 2 1 3 3 1 5 0 0 0 
030 F 19 DISLIKED 0 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 
118 
119 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
031 F 18 DISLIKED 1 3 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 
033 F 19 DISLIKED 1 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
058 F 18 DISLIKED 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 
060 F 19 DISLIKED 4 4 2 0 1 4 2 0 0 
062 F 18 DISLIKED 1 3 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 
065 F 18 DISLIKED 2 3 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 
066 F 18 DISLIKED 3 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
069 M 19 DISLIKED 1 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 
094 F 19 DISLIKED 1 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 
095 F 17 DISLIKED 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 
098 F 22 DISLIKED 1 2 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 
099 F 18 DISLIKED 4 3 3 5 1 1 1 0 2 
101 M 19 DISLIKED 1 0 1 5 3 1 2 0 0 
102 M 18 DISLIKED 0 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 1 
NEGATIVE SETTING 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
012 F 17 LIKED 3 3 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 
013 M 19 LIKED 2 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 0 
017 F 18 LIKED 4 1 0 5 1 0 0 1 0 
018 F 18 LIKED 3 0 1 2 2 1 0 3 0 
021 F 19 LIKED 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 
047 F 18 LIKED 4 2 4 3 1 1 1 2 3 
048 F 18 LIKED 4 1 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 
051 M 19 LIKED 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
052 F 18 LIKED 4 2 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 
054 M 18 LIKED 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
056 F 18 LIKED 3 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 
080 F 18 LIKED 4 5 2 3 2 3 0 1 0 
082 F 20 LIKED 3 4 1 2 2 3 0 1 0 
083 F 18 LIKED 3 1 4 0 1 3 1 2 1 
085 F 19 LIKED 5 1 4 0 1 2 0 0 1 
087 F 20 LIKED 4 1 2 3 3 1 0 0 0 
090 F 18 LIKED 4 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 
092 F 18 LIKED 3 3 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 
014 F 18 DISLIKED 1 1 3 2 0 2 3 1 2 
015 F 18 DISLIKED 3 5 3 1 4 1 3 0 0 
016 M DISLIKED 6 6 3 3 5 0 1 0 0 
019 F 20 DISLIKED 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 0 0 
020 F 17 DISLIKED 0 2 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 
046 M 18 DISLIKED 1 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 
049 F 18 DISLIKED 3 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 
050 F 19 DISLIKED 2 6 2 1 0 0 4 0 0 
120 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
053 M 17 DISLIKED 0 2 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 
055 M 20 DISLIKED 2 4 3 1 2 2 2 0 1 
057 F 20 DISLIKED 5 7 4 5 1 5 1 0 1 
081 F 18 DISLIKED 0 5 0 4 0 1 1 0 1 
084 F 18 DISLIKED 3 4 4 3 2 0 3 0 0 
086 M 19 DISLIKED 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
088 F 18 DISLIKED 3 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
089 F 25 DISLIKED 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
091 F 21 DISLIKED 0 2 2 3 1 1 2 0 0 
AMBIVALENT SETTING 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
002 F 19 LIKED 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
004 F 22 LIKED 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
005 F 18 LIKED 2 0 4 1 3 2 0 1 0 
008 M 17 LIKED 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
009 M 19 LIKED 3 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
036 F 18 LIKED 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
037 M 18 LIKED 4 4 3 2 0 3 0 1 0 
038 M LIKED 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 
040 F 27 LIKED 2 4 4 2 2 2 0 1 0 
042 M 18 LIKED 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 
045 M 18 LIKED 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
074 F 20 LIKED 2 1 3 2 0 2 1 0 0 
075 F 18 LIKED 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
076 F 18 LIKED 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
077 F 18 LIKED 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
079 F 17 LIKED 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
001 M 18 DISLIKED 1 5 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 
003 F 18 DISLIKED 1 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 
006 F 18 DISLIKED 3 2 5 0 0 0 2 1 1 
007 F 19 DISLIKED 0 2 1 2 0 3 1 0 0 
010 F 18 DISLIKED 3 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 1 
011 F 18 DISLIKED 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 
034 M 18 DISLIKED 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 
035 F 18 DISLIKED 2 3 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 
039 F 18 DISLIKED 1 4 1 1 3 3 3 0 2 
041 F 18 DISLIKED 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 
043 F 18 DISLIKED 4 2 3 1 2 4 0 0 0 
044 F 20 DISLIKED 2 1 3 0 3 0 2 0 0 
070 M 18 DISLIKED 1 3 1 0 1 0 4 1 0 
071 M 18 DISLIKED 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 
072 F 18 DISLIKED 1 2 1 3 2 0 1 0 0 
121 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
073 M 24 DISLIKED 2 3 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 
078 F 18 DISLIKED 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 
"NO" SETTING 
1st Recall 2nd Recall 3rd Recall 
Subj Task Task Task 
No. Sex Age L/D Target Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb Pos Neg Amb 
104 M 22 LIKED 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
105 F 19 LIKED 6 0 1 2 3 0 0 2 0 
106 F 18 LIKED 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 
107 F 19 LIKED 4 3 5 1 2 3 0 1 1 
108 F 20 LIKED 2 0 2 1 4 0 0 3 0 
109 F 20 LIKED 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
110 F 18 LIKED 2 0 2 1 3 1 0 2 0 
111 M 18 LIKED 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
112 M 18 LIKED 2 2 1 3 1 1 0 2 0 
113 M 20 LIKED 5 3 0 2 3 1 0 2 1 
114 F 21 LIKED 2 3 1 1 5 2 0 1 1 
115 F 24 LIKED 4 2 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 
116 M 21 LIKED 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
117 M 21 LIKED 3 3 6 1 2 0 0 2 0 
118 F 19 LIKED 4 2 2 3 3 2 0 3 2 
119 F 19 LIKED 5 4 5 3 3 2 0 1 0 
120 M 20 LIKED 3 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 
121 M 19 DISLIKED 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 
122 F 21 DISLIKED 0 3 3 3 1 0 2 0 1 
123 F 19 DISLIKED 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 1 
124 F 20 DISLIKED 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 
125 F 18 DISLIKED 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 0 1 
126 F 18 DISLIKED 0 3 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 
127 M 20 DISLIKED 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 
128 F 18 DISLIKED 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
129 F 18 DISLIKED 0 4 4 6 0 3 1 0 0 
130 F DISLIKED 0 3 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
131 F 19 DISLIKED 2 5 2 1 2 1 2 0 0 
132 F 19 DISLIKED 0 6 2 3 0 1 6 0 0 
133 F 19 DISLIKED 3 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 
134 F 19 DISLIKED 3 4 4 5 0 0 1 1 1 
135 M 21 DISLIKED 2 4 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 
136 F 19 DISLIKED 1 2 2 3 1 0 2 0 0 
137 F 18 DISLIKED 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
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